diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
index 201d10319fa1..1df1177df68a 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
@@ -42,8 +42,30 @@ Description:
 		modification of EVM-protected metadata and
 		disable all further modification of policy
 
-		Note that once a key has been loaded, it will no longer be
-		possible to enable metadata modification.
+		Echoing a value is additive, the new value is added to the
+		existing initialization flags.
+
+		For example, after::
+
+		  echo 2 ><securityfs>/evm
+
+		another echo can be performed::
+
+		  echo 1 ><securityfs>/evm
+
+		and the resulting value will be 3.
+
+		Note that once an HMAC key has been loaded, it will no longer
+		be possible to enable metadata modification. Signaling that an
+		HMAC key has been loaded will clear the corresponding flag.
+		For example, if the current value is 6 (2 and 4 set)::
+
+		  echo 1 ><securityfs>/evm
+
+		will set the new value to 3 (4 cleared).
+
+		Loading an HMAC key is the only way to disable metadata
+		modification.
 
 		Until key loading has been signaled EVM can not create
 		or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio
index a5b4f223641d..d10bcca6c3fb 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ Description:
 
 What:		/sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_positionrelative_x_raw
 What:		/sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_positionrelative_y_raw
-KernelVersion:	4.18
+KernelVersion:	4.19
 Contact:	linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
 Description:
 		Relative position in direction x or y on a pad (may be
@@ -1559,7 +1559,8 @@ What:		/sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_concentrationX_voc_raw
 KernelVersion:	4.3
 Contact:	linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
 Description:
-		Raw (unscaled no offset etc.) percentage reading of a substance.
+		Raw (unscaled no offset etc.) reading of a substance. Units
+		after application of scale and offset are percents.
 
 What:		/sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_resistance_raw
 What:		/sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_resistanceX_raw
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-mei linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-mei
index 6bd45346ac7e..3f8701e8fa24 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-mei
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-mei
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ KernelVersion:	3.10
 Contact:	Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
 		linux-mei@linux.intel.com
 Description:	Stores the same MODALIAS value emitted by uevent
-		Format: mei:<mei device name>:<device uuid>:
+		Format: mei:<mei device name>:<device uuid>:<protocol version>
 
 What:		/sys/bus/mei/devices/.../name
 Date:		May 2015
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-devfreq linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-devfreq
index ee39acacf6f8..335595a79866 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-devfreq
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-devfreq
@@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ Description:
 		The name of devfreq object denoted as ... is same as the
 		name of device using devfreq.
 
+What:		/sys/class/devfreq/.../name
+Date:		November 2019
+Contact:	Chanwoo Choi <cw00.choi@samsung.com>
+Description:
+		The /sys/class/devfreq/.../name shows the name of device
+		of the corresponding devfreq object.
+
 What:		/sys/class/devfreq/.../governor
 Date:		September 2011
 Contact:	MyungJoo Ham <myungjoo.ham@samsung.com>
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi
index 7122d6264c49..c310db4ccbc2 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Contact:	Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
 Description:
 		Unsigned integer.
 
-		Write a number ranging from 1 to 127 to add a qmap mux
+		Write a number ranging from 1 to 254 to add a qmap mux
 		based network device, supported by recent Qualcomm based
 		modems.
 
@@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ Contact:	Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
 Description:
 		Unsigned integer.
 
-		Write a number ranging from 1 to 127 to delete a previously
+		Write a number ranging from 1 to 254 to delete a previously
 		created qmap mux based network device.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
index 73318225a368..b9c14c11efc5 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -477,6 +477,10 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
@@ -489,8 +493,7 @@ Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
 		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
 		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
 
-		Details about the l1tf file can be found in
-		Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+		See also: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
 
 What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/README.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/README.rst
index 882e1492b82e..36e97c66f203 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/README.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/README.rst
@@ -39,6 +39,12 @@ What is GNU Linux-libre?
   promotion.  See our web page for their images.
   http://linux-libre.fsfla.org/
 
+  If you are the author of an awesome program and want to join us in
+  writing Free (libre) Software, please consider making it an official
+  GNU program and become a GNU Maintainer.  You can find instructions
+  on how to do so at https://www.gnu.org/help/evaluation.  We look
+  forward to hacking with you! :)
+
 What is Linux?
 --------------
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ca4dbdd9016d
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+========================
+Hardware vulnerabilities
+========================
+
+This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
+possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
+are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   spectre
+   l1tf
+   mds
+   tsx_async_abort
+   multihit.rst
+   special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
similarity index 99%
rename from Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
rename to Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
index bae52b845de0..31653a9f0e1b 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
@@ -405,6 +405,9 @@ time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
 
   off		Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
 		warnings.
+		It also drops the swap size and available RAM limit restrictions
+		on both hypervisor and bare metal.
+
   ============  =============================================================
 
 The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
@@ -442,6 +445,7 @@ The default is 'cond'. If 'l1tf=full,force' is given on the kernel command
 line, then 'always' is enforced and the kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush
 module parameter is ignored and writes to the sysfs file are rejected.
 
+.. _mitigation_selection:
 
 Mitigation selection guide
 --------------------------
@@ -553,7 +557,7 @@ When nested virtualization is in use, three operating systems are involved:
 the bare metal hypervisor, the nested hypervisor and the nested virtual
 machine.  VMENTER operations from the nested hypervisor into the nested
 guest will always be processed by the bare metal hypervisor. If KVM is the
-bare metal hypervisor it wiil:
+bare metal hypervisor it will:
 
  - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested hypervisor to the
    nested virtual machine, so that the nested hypervisor's secrets are not
@@ -576,7 +580,8 @@ Default mitigations
   The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
 
   - PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
-    unconditionally and cannot be controlled.
+    unconditionally and cannot be controlled. The swap storage is limited
+    to ~16TB.
 
   - L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
     a guest.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2d19c9f4c1fe
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+MDS - Microarchitectural Data Sampling
+======================================
+
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows
+unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in various CPU
+internal buffers.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
+vulnerability is not present on:
+
+   - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
+
+   - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
+
+   - Some Atoms (Bonnell, Saltwell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus)
+
+   - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO bit set in the
+     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the MDS
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`mds_sys_info`.
+
+Not all processors are affected by all variants of MDS, but the mitigation
+is identical for all of them so the kernel treats them as a single
+vulnerability.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries are related to the MDS vulnerability:
+
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+   CVE-2018-12126  MSBDS  Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
+   CVE-2018-12130  MFBDS  Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
+   CVE-2018-12127  MLPDS  Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
+   CVE-2019-11091  MDSUM  Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+When performing store, load, L1 refill operations, processors write data
+into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in the
+buffer can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
+
+Under certain conditions, usually a fault/assist caused by a load
+operation, data unrelated to the load memory address can be speculatively
+forwarded from the buffers. Because the load operation causes a fault or
+assist and its result will be discarded, the forwarded data will not cause
+incorrect program execution or state changes. But a malicious operation
+may be able to forward this speculative data to a disclosure gadget which
+allows in turn to infer the value via a cache side channel attack.
+
+Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
+Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
+
+Deeper technical information is available in the MDS specific x86
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/mds.rst <mds>`.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the MDS vulnerabilities can be mounted from malicious non
+priviledged user space applications running on hosts or guest. Malicious
+guest OSes can obviously mount attacks as well.
+
+Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS vulnerability
+does not allow the attacker to control the memory target address. As a
+consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but as demonstrated with
+the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed successfully.
+
+Web-Browsers
+^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  It's unclear whether attacks through Web-Browsers are possible at
+  all. The exploitation through Java-Script is considered very unlikely,
+  but other widely used web technologies like Webassembly could possibly be
+  abused.
+
+
+.. _mds_sys_info:
+
+MDS system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current MDS
+status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  .. list-table::
+
+     * - 'Not affected'
+       - The processor is not vulnerable
+     * - 'Vulnerable'
+       - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+     * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
+       - The processor is vulnerable but microcode is not updated.
+
+         The mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis. See :ref:`vmwerv`
+     * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
+       - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
+         enabled.
+
+If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended
+to the above information:
+
+    ========================  ============================================
+    'SMT vulnerable'          SMT is enabled
+    'SMT mitigated'           SMT is enabled and mitigated
+    'SMT disabled'            SMT is disabled
+    'SMT Host state unknown'  Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown
+    ========================  ============================================
+
+.. _vmwerv:
+
+Best effort mitigation mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode based
+  mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
+  effort mitigation mode.  This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
+  without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
+
+  This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
+  microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose
+  the CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection
+  takes effect otherwise a few cpu cycles are wasted pointlessly.
+
+  The state in the mds sysfs file reflects this situation accordingly.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode
+which is required.
+
+If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
+enables the mitigation by default. The mitigation can be controlled at boot
+time via a kernel command line option. See
+:ref:`mds_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+.. _cpu_buffer_clear:
+
+CPU buffer clearing
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The mitigation for MDS clears the affected CPU buffers on return to user
+  space and when entering a guest.
+
+  If SMT is enabled it also clears the buffers on idle entry when the CPU
+  is only affected by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant, because the
+  other variants cannot be protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks.
+
+  For CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS the user space, guest and idle
+  transition mitigations are sufficient and SMT is not affected.
+
+.. _virt_mechanism:
+
+Virtualization mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The protection for host to guest transition depends on the L1TF
+  vulnerability of the CPU:
+
+  - CPU is affected by L1TF:
+
+    If the L1D flush mitigation is enabled and up to date microcode is
+    available, the L1D flush mitigation is automatically protecting the
+    guest transition.
+
+    If the L1D flush mitigation is disabled then the MDS mitigation is
+    invoked explicit when the host MDS mitigation is enabled.
+
+    For details on L1TF and virtualization see:
+    :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <mitigation_control_kvm>`.
+
+  - CPU is not affected by L1TF:
+
+    CPU buffers are flushed before entering the guest when the host MDS
+    mitigation is enabled.
+
+  The resulting MDS protection matrix for the host to guest transition:
+
+  ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+   L1TF         MDS   VMX-L1FLUSH   Host MDS     MDS-State
+
+   Don't care   No    Don't care    N/A          Not affected
+
+   Yes          Yes   Disabled      Off          Vulnerable
+
+   Yes          Yes   Disabled      Full         Mitigated
+
+   Yes          Yes   Enabled       Don't care   Mitigated
+
+   No           Yes   N/A           Off          Vulnerable
+
+   No           Yes   N/A           Full         Mitigated
+  ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+
+  This only covers the host to guest transition, i.e. prevents leakage from
+  host to guest, but does not protect the guest internally. Guests need to
+  have their own protections.
+
+.. _xeon_phi:
+
+XEON PHI specific considerations
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The XEON PHI processor family is affected by MSBDS which can be exploited
+  cross Hyper-Threads when entering idle states. Some XEON PHI variants allow
+  to use MWAIT in user space (Ring 3) which opens an potential attack vector
+  for malicious user space. The exposure can be disabled on the kernel
+  command line with the 'ring3mwait=disable' command line option.
+
+  XEON PHI is not affected by the other MDS variants and MSBDS is mitigated
+  before the CPU enters a idle state. As XEON PHI is not affected by L1TF
+  either disabling SMT is not required for full protection.
+
+.. _mds_smt_control:
+
+SMT control
+^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  All MDS variants except MSBDS can be attacked cross Hyper-Threads. That
+  means on CPUs which are affected by MFBDS or MLPDS it is necessary to
+  disable SMT for full protection. These are most of the affected CPUs; the
+  exception is XEON PHI, see :ref:`xeon_phi`.
+
+  Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but the impact
+  depends on the type of workloads.
+
+  See the relevant chapter in the L1TF mitigation documentation for details:
+  :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst <smt_control>`.
+
+
+.. _mds_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the MDS mitigations at boot
+time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  full		If the CPU is vulnerable, enable all available mitigations
+		for the MDS vulnerability, CPU buffer clearing on exit to
+		userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are
+		protected as well if SMT is enabled.
+
+		It does not automatically disable SMT.
+
+  full,nosmt	The same as mds=full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable
+		CPUs.  This is the complete mitigation.
+
+  off		Disables MDS mitigations completely.
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full". For processors
+that are affected by both TAA (TSX Asynchronous Abort) and MDS,
+specifying just "mds=off" without an accompanying "tsx_async_abort=off"
+will have no effect as the same mitigation is used for both
+vulnerabilities.
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If all userspace applications are from a trusted source and do not
+   execute untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation
+   can be disabled.
+
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The same considerations as above versus trusted user space apply.
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The protection depends on the state of the L1TF mitigations.
+   See :ref:`virt_mechanism`.
+
+   If the MDS mitigation is enabled and SMT is disabled, guest to host and
+   guest to guest attacks are prevented.
+
+.. _mds_default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+  The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
+
+  - Enable CPU buffer clearing
+
+  The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
+  SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted code. The same rationale as
+  for L1TF applies.
+  See :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <default_mitigations>`.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/multihit.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/multihit.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ba9988d8bce5
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/multihit.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+iTLB multihit
+=============
+
+iTLB multihit is an erratum where some processors may incur a machine check
+error, possibly resulting in an unrecoverable CPU lockup, when an
+instruction fetch hits multiple entries in the instruction TLB. This can
+occur when the page size is changed along with either the physical address
+or cache type. A malicious guest running on a virtualized system can
+exploit this erratum to perform a denial of service attack.
+
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+Variations of this erratum are present on most Intel Core and Xeon processor
+models. The erratum is not present on:
+
+   - non-Intel processors
+
+   - Some Atoms (Airmont, Bonnell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus, Saltwell, Silvermont)
+
+   - Intel processors that have the PSCHANGE_MC_NO bit set in the
+     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
+
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this issue:
+
+   ==============  =================================================
+   CVE-2018-12207  Machine Check Error Avoidance on Page Size Change
+   ==============  =================================================
+
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+Privileged software, including OS and virtual machine managers (VMM), are in
+charge of memory management. A key component in memory management is the control
+of the page tables. Modern processors use virtual memory, a technique that creates
+the illusion of a very large memory for processors. This virtual space is split
+into pages of a given size. Page tables translate virtual addresses to physical
+addresses.
+
+To reduce latency when performing a virtual to physical address translation,
+processors include a structure, called TLB, that caches recent translations.
+There are separate TLBs for instruction (iTLB) and data (dTLB).
+
+Under this errata, instructions are fetched from a linear address translated
+using a 4 KB translation cached in the iTLB. Privileged software modifies the
+paging structure so that the same linear address using large page size (2 MB, 4
+MB, 1 GB) with a different physical address or memory type.  After the page
+structure modification but before the software invalidates any iTLB entries for
+the linear address, a code fetch that happens on the same linear address may
+cause a machine-check error which can result in a system hang or shutdown.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the iTLB multihit erratum can be mounted from malicious
+guests in a virtualized system.
+
+
+iTLB multihit system information
+--------------------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current iTLB
+multihit status of the system:whether the system is vulnerable and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+     * - Not affected
+       - The processor is not vulnerable.
+     * - KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages
+       - Software changes mitigate this issue.
+     * - KVM: Vulnerable
+       - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+
+
+Enumeration of the erratum
+--------------------------------
+
+A new bit has been allocated in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) msr
+and will be set on CPU's which are mitigated against this issue.
+
+   =======================================   ===========   ===============================
+   IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR                Not present   Possibly vulnerable,check model
+   IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[PSCHANGE_MC_NO]    '0'           Likely vulnerable,check model
+   IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[PSCHANGE_MC_NO]    '1'           Not vulnerable
+   =======================================   ===========   ===============================
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+This erratum can be mitigated by restricting the use of large page sizes to
+non-executable pages.  This forces all iTLB entries to be 4K, and removes
+the possibility of multiple hits.
+
+In order to mitigate the vulnerability, KVM initially marks all huge pages
+as non-executable. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages,
+the page is broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
+
+If EPT is disabled or not available on the host, KVM is in control of TLB
+flushes and the problematic situation cannot happen.  However, the shadow
+EPT paging mechanism used by nested virtualization is vulnerable, because
+the nested guest can trigger multiple iTLB hits by modifying its own
+(non-nested) page tables.  For simplicity, KVM will make large pages
+non-executable in all shadow paging modes.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line and KVM - module parameter
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism for marking huge pages as
+non-executable can be controlled with a module parameter "nx_huge_pages=".
+The kernel command line allows to control the iTLB multihit mitigations at
+boot time with the option "kvm.nx_huge_pages=".
+
+The valid arguments for these options are:
+
+  ==========  ================================================================
+  force       Mitigation is enabled. In this case, the mitigation implements
+              non-executable huge pages in Linux kernel KVM module. All huge
+              pages in the EPT are marked as non-executable.
+              If a guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
+              broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
+
+  off	      Mitigation is disabled.
+
+  auto        Enable mitigation only if the platform is affected and the kernel
+              was not booted with the "mitigations=off" command line parameter.
+	      This is the default option.
+  ==========  ================================================================
+
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. No virtualization in use
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
+   action is required.
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If the guest comes from a trusted source, you may assume that the guest will
+   not attempt to maliciously exploit these errata and no further action is
+   required.
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+   If the guest comes from an untrusted source, the guest host kernel will need
+   to apply iTLB multihit mitigation via the kernel command line or kvm
+   module parameter.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..47b1b3afac99
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+SRBDS - Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+=============================================
+
+SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS :doc:`mds` techniques to
+infer values returned from special register accesses.  Special register
+accesses are accesses to off core registers.  According to Intel's evaluation,
+the special register reads that have a security expectation of privacy are
+RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY.
+
+When RDRAND, RDSEED and EGETKEY instructions are used, the data is moved
+to the core through the special register mechanism that is susceptible
+to MDS attacks.
+
+Affected processors
+--------------------
+Core models (desktop, mobile, Xeon-E3) that implement RDRAND and/or RDSEED may
+be affected.
+
+A processor is affected by SRBDS if its Family_Model and stepping is
+in the following list, with the exception of the listed processors
+exporting MDS_NO while Intel TSX is available yet not enabled. The
+latter class of processors are only affected when Intel TSX is enabled
+by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected.
+
+  =============  ============  ========
+  common name    Family_Model  Stepping
+  =============  ============  ========
+  IvyBridge      06_3AH        All
+
+  Haswell        06_3CH        All
+  Haswell_L      06_45H        All
+  Haswell_G      06_46H        All
+
+  Broadwell_G    06_47H        All
+  Broadwell      06_3DH        All
+
+  Skylake_L      06_4EH        All
+  Skylake        06_5EH        All
+
+  Kabylake_L     06_8EH        <= 0xC
+  Kabylake       06_9EH        <= 0xD
+  =============  ============  ========
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this SRBDS issue:
+
+    ==============  =====  =====================================
+    CVE-2020-0543   SRBDS  Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+    ==============  =====  =====================================
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+An unprivileged user can extract values returned from RDRAND and RDSEED
+executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------
+Intel will release microcode updates that modify the RDRAND, RDSEED, and
+EGETKEY instructions to overwrite secret special register data in the shared
+staging buffer before the secret data can be accessed by another logical
+processor.
+
+During execution of the RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions, off-core
+accesses from other logical processors will be delayed until the special
+register read is complete and the secret data in the shared staging buffer is
+overwritten.
+
+This has three effects on performance:
+
+#. RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions have higher latency.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND at the same time on multiple logical processors will be
+   serialized, resulting in an overall reduction in the maximum RDRAND
+   bandwidth.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND, RDSEED or EGETKEY will delay memory accesses from other
+   logical processors that miss their core caches, with an impact similar to
+   legacy locked cache-line-split accesses.
+
+The microcode updates provide an opt-out mechanism (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to disable
+the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions executed outside of Intel
+Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) enclaves. On logical processors that
+disable the mitigation using this opt-out mechanism, RDRAND and RDSEED do not
+take longer to execute and do not impact performance of sibling logical
+processors memory accesses. The opt-out mechanism does not affect Intel SGX
+enclaves (including execution of RDRAND or RDSEED inside an enclave, as well
+as EGETKEY execution).
+
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR Definition
+--------------------------------
+Along with the mitigation for this issue, Intel added a new thread-scope
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR, (address 0x123). The presence of this MSR and
+RNGDS_MITG_DIS (bit 0) is enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0).EDX[SRBDS_CTRL =
+9]==1. This MSR is introduced through the microcode update.
+
+Setting IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[0] (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to 1 for a logical processor
+disables the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED executed outside of an Intel SGX
+enclave on that logical processor. Opting out of the mitigation for a
+particular logical processor does not affect the RDRAND and RDSEED mitigations
+for other logical processors.
+
+Note that inside of an Intel SGX enclave, the mitigation is applied regardless
+of the value of RNGDS_MITG_DS.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The kernel command line allows control over the SRBDS mitigation at boot time
+with the option "srbds=".  The option for this is:
+
+  ============= =============================================================
+  off           This option disables SRBDS mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED on
+                affected platforms.
+  ============= =============================================================
+
+SRBDS System Information
+-----------------------
+The Linux kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs.  For
+SRBDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
+
+The possible values contained in this file are:
+
+ ============================== =============================================
+ Not affected                   Processor not vulnerable
+ Vulnerable                     Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled
+ Vulnerable: No microcode       Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
+                                mitigation
+ Mitigation: Microcode          Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+                                effect.
+ Mitigation: TSX disabled       Processor is only vulnerable when TSX is
+                                enabled while this system was booted with TSX
+                                disabled.
+ Unknown: Dependent on
+ hypervisor status              Running on virtual guest processor that is
+                                affected but with no way to know if host
+                                processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
+ ============================== =============================================
+
+SRBDS Default mitigation
+------------------------
+This new microcode serializes processor access during execution of RDRAND,
+RDSEED ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for
+reuse.  Use the "srbds=off" kernel command line to disable the mitigation for
+RDRAND and RDSEED.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e05e581af5cf
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,769 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Spectre Side Channels
+=====================
+
+Spectre is a class of side channel attacks that exploit branch prediction
+and speculative execution on modern CPUs to read memory, possibly
+bypassing access controls. Speculative execution side channel exploits
+do not modify memory but attempt to infer privileged data in the memory.
+
+This document covers Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+Speculative execution side channel methods affect a wide range of modern
+high performance processors, since most modern high speed processors
+use branch prediction and speculative execution.
+
+The following CPUs are vulnerable:
+
+    - Intel Core, Atom, Pentium, and Xeon processors
+
+    - AMD Phenom, EPYC, and Zen processors
+
+    - IBM POWER and zSeries processors
+
+    - Higher end ARM processors
+
+    - Apple CPUs
+
+    - Higher end MIPS CPUs
+
+    - Likely most other high performance CPUs. Contact your CPU vendor for details.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the Spectre
+vulnerability files in sysfs. See :ref:`spectre_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries describe Spectre variants:
+
+   =============   =======================  ==========================
+   CVE-2017-5753   Bounds check bypass      Spectre variant 1
+   CVE-2017-5715   Branch target injection  Spectre variant 2
+   CVE-2019-1125   Spectre v1 swapgs        Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)
+   =============   =======================  ==========================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+CPUs use speculative operations to improve performance. That may leave
+traces of memory accesses or computations in the processor's caches,
+buffers, and branch predictors. Malicious software may be able to
+influence the speculative execution paths, and then use the side effects
+of the speculative execution in the CPUs' caches and buffers to infer
+privileged data touched during the speculative execution.
+
+Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
+conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
+execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
+:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+
+Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
+---------------------------------------
+
+The bounds check bypass attack :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>` takes advantage
+of speculative execution that bypasses conditional branch instructions
+used for memory access bounds check (e.g. checking if the index of an
+array results in memory access within a valid range). This results in
+memory accesses to invalid memory (with out-of-bound index) that are
+done speculatively before validation checks resolve. Such speculative
+memory accesses can leave side effects, creating side channels which
+leak information to the attacker.
+
+There are some extensions of Spectre variant 1 attacks for reading data
+over the network, see :ref:`[12] <spec_ref12>`. However such attacks
+are difficult, low bandwidth, fragile, and are considered low risk.
+
+Note that, despite "Bounds Check Bypass" name, Spectre variant 1 is not
+only about user-controlled array bounds checks.  It can affect any
+conditional checks.  The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI
+handlers all have conditional swapgs checks.  Those may be problematic
+in the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with
+a user GS.
+
+Spectre variant 2 (Branch Target Injection)
+-------------------------------------------
+
+The branch target injection attack takes advantage of speculative
+execution of indirect branches :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>`.  The indirect
+branch predictors inside the processor used to guess the target of
+indirect branches can be influenced by an attacker, causing gadget code
+to be speculatively executed, thus exposing sensitive data touched by
+the victim. The side effects left in the CPU's caches during speculative
+execution can be measured to infer data values.
+
+.. _poison_btb:
+
+In Spectre variant 2 attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect
+branches in the victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target
+buffer of a CPU used for predicting indirect branch addresses. Such
+poisoning could be done by indirect branching into existing code,
+with the address offset of the indirect branch under the attacker's
+control. Since the branch prediction on impacted hardware does not
+fully disambiguate branch address and uses the offset for prediction,
+this could cause privileged code's indirect branch to jump to a gadget
+code with the same offset.
+
+The most useful gadgets take an attacker-controlled input parameter (such
+as a register value) so that the memory read can be controlled. Gadgets
+without input parameters might be possible, but the attacker would have
+very little control over what memory can be read, reducing the risk of
+the attack revealing useful data.
+
+One other variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
+return stack buffer (RSB) :ref:`[13] <spec_ref13>` to cause speculative
+subroutine return instruction execution to go to a gadget.  An attacker's
+imbalanced subroutine call instructions might "poison" entries in the
+return stack buffer which are later consumed by a victim's subroutine
+return instructions.  This attack can be mitigated by flushing the return
+stack buffer on context switch, or virtual machine (VM) exit.
+
+On systems with simultaneous multi-threading (SMT), attacks are possible
+from the sibling thread, as level 1 cache and branch target buffer
+(BTB) may be shared between hardware threads in a CPU core.  A malicious
+program running on the sibling thread may influence its peer's BTB to
+steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the
+speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the
+victim's data.
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+The following list of attack scenarios have been anticipated, but may
+not cover all possible attack vectors.
+
+1. A user process attacking the kernel
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Spectre variant 1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   The attacker passes a parameter to the kernel via a register or
+   via a known address in memory during a syscall. Such parameter may
+   be used later by the kernel as an index to an array or to derive
+   a pointer for a Spectre variant 1 attack.  The index or pointer
+   is invalid, but bound checks are bypassed in the code branch taken
+   for speculative execution. This could cause privileged memory to be
+   accessed and leaked.
+
+   For kernel code that has been identified where data pointers could
+   potentially be influenced for Spectre attacks, new "nospec" accessor
+   macros are used to prevent speculative loading of data.
+
+Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   An attacker can train the branch predictor to speculatively skip the
+   swapgs path for an interrupt or exception.  If they initialize
+   the GS register to a user-space value, if the swapgs is speculatively
+   skipped, subsequent GS-related percpu accesses in the speculation
+   window will be done with the attacker-controlled GS value.  This
+   could cause privileged memory to be accessed and leaked.
+
+   For example:
+
+   ::
+
+     if (coming from user space)
+         swapgs
+     mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg
+     mov (%reg), %reg1
+
+   When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the
+   swapgs, and then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS
+   value.  So the user can speculatively force a read of any kernel
+   value.  If a gadget exists which uses the percpu value as an address
+   in another load/store, then the contents of the kernel value may
+   become visible via an L1 side channel attack.
+
+   A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space.  The CPU can
+   speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the
+   rest of the speculative window.
+
+Spectre variant 2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   A spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch
+   target buffer (BTB) before issuing syscall to launch an attack.
+   After entering the kernel, the kernel could use the poisoned branch
+   target buffer on indirect jump and jump to gadget code in speculative
+   execution.
+
+   If an attacker tries to control the memory addresses leaked during
+   speculative execution, he would also need to pass a parameter to the
+   gadget, either through a register or a known address in memory. After
+   the gadget has executed, he can measure the side effect.
+
+   The kernel can protect itself against consuming poisoned branch
+   target buffer entries by using return trampolines (also known as
+   "retpoline") :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` for all
+   indirect branches. Return trampolines trap speculative execution paths
+   to prevent jumping to gadget code during speculative execution.
+   x86 CPUs with Enhanced Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation
+   (Enhanced IBRS) available in hardware should use the feature to
+   mitigate Spectre variant 2 instead of retpoline. Enhanced IBRS is
+   more efficient than retpoline.
+
+   There may be gadget code in firmware which could be exploited with
+   Spectre variant 2 attack by a rogue user process. To mitigate such
+   attacks on x86, Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) feature
+   is turned on before the kernel invokes any firmware code.
+
+2. A user process attacking another user process
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   A malicious user process can try to attack another user process,
+   either via a context switch on the same hardware thread, or from the
+   sibling hyperthread sharing a physical processor core on simultaneous
+   multi-threading (SMT) system.
+
+   Spectre variant 1 attacks generally require passing parameters
+   between the processes, which needs a data passing relationship, such
+   as remote procedure calls (RPC).  Those parameters are used in gadget
+   code to derive invalid data pointers accessing privileged memory in
+   the attacked process.
+
+   Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue process by
+   :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer.  This can
+   influence the indirect branch targets for a victim process that either
+   runs later on the same hardware thread, or running concurrently on
+   a sibling hardware thread sharing the same physical core.
+
+   A user process can protect itself against Spectre variant 2 attacks
+   by using the prctl() syscall to disable indirect branch speculation
+   for itself.  An administrator can also cordon off an unsafe process
+   from polluting the branch target buffer by disabling the process's
+   indirect branch speculation. This comes with a performance cost
+   from not using indirect branch speculation and clearing the branch
+   target buffer.  When SMT is enabled on x86, for a process that has
+   indirect branch speculation disabled, Single Threaded Indirect Branch
+   Predictors (STIBP) :ref:`[4] <spec_ref4>` are turned on to prevent the
+   sibling thread from controlling branch target buffer.  In addition,
+   the Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) is issued to clear the
+   branch target buffer when context switching to and from such process.
+
+   On x86, the return stack buffer is stuffed on context switch.
+   This prevents the branch target buffer from being used for branch
+   prediction when the return stack buffer underflows while switching to
+   a deeper call stack. Any poisoned entries in the return stack buffer
+   left by the previous process will also be cleared.
+
+   User programs should use address space randomization to make attacks
+   more difficult (Set /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2).
+
+3. A virtualized guest attacking the host
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The attack mechanism is similar to how user processes attack the
+   kernel.  The kernel is entered via hyper-calls or other virtualization
+   exit paths.
+
+   For Spectre variant 1 attacks, rogue guests can pass parameters
+   (e.g. in registers) via hyper-calls to derive invalid pointers to
+   speculate into privileged memory after entering the kernel.  For places
+   where such kernel code has been identified, nospec accessor macros
+   are used to stop speculative memory access.
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 attacks, rogue guests can :ref:`poison
+   <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or return stack buffer, causing
+   the kernel to jump to gadget code in the speculative execution paths.
+
+   To mitigate variant 2, the host kernel can use return trampolines
+   for indirect branches to bypass the poisoned branch target buffer,
+   and flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit.  This prevents rogue
+   guests from affecting indirect branching in the host kernel.
+
+   To protect host processes from rogue guests, host processes can have
+   indirect branch speculation disabled via prctl().  The branch target
+   buffer is cleared before context switching to such processes.
+
+4. A virtualized guest attacking other guest
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   A rogue guest may attack another guest to get data accessible by the
+   other guest.
+
+   Spectre variant 1 attacks are possible if parameters can be passed
+   between guests.  This may be done via mechanisms such as shared memory
+   or message passing.  Such parameters could be used to derive data
+   pointers to privileged data in guest.  The privileged data could be
+   accessed by gadget code in the victim's speculation paths.
+
+   Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue guest by
+   :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or the return
+   stack buffer. Such poisoned entries could be used to influence
+   speculation execution paths in the victim guest.
+
+   Linux kernel mitigates attacks to other guests running in the same
+   CPU hardware thread by flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit,
+   and clearing the branch target buffer before switching to a new guest.
+
+   If SMT is used, Spectre variant 2 attacks from an untrusted guest
+   in the sibling hyperthread can be mitigated by the administrator,
+   by turning off the unsafe guest's indirect branch speculation via
+   prctl().  A guest can also protect itself by turning on microcode
+   based mitigations (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) within the guest.
+
+.. _spectre_sys_info:
+
+Spectre system information
+--------------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current
+mitigation status of the system for Spectre: whether the system is
+vulnerable, and which mitigations are active.
+
+The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 1 mitigation status is:
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  .. list-table::
+
+     * - 'Not affected'
+       - The processor is not vulnerable.
+     * - 'Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers'
+       - The swapgs protections are disabled; otherwise it has
+         protection in the kernel on a case by case base with explicit
+         pointer sanitation and usercopy LFENCE barriers.
+     * - 'Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization'
+       - Protection in the kernel on a case by case base with explicit
+         pointer sanitation, usercopy LFENCE barriers, and swapgs LFENCE
+         barriers.
+
+However, the protections are put in place on a case by case basis,
+and there is no guarantee that all possible attack vectors for Spectre
+variant 1 are covered.
+
+The spectre_v2 kernel file reports if the kernel has been compiled with
+retpoline mitigation or if the CPU has hardware mitigation, and if the
+CPU has support for additional process-specific mitigation.
+
+This file also reports CPU features enabled by microcode to mitigate
+attack between user processes:
+
+1. Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) to add additional
+   isolation between processes of different users.
+2. Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP) to add additional
+   isolation between CPU threads running on the same core.
+
+These CPU features may impact performance when used and can be enabled
+per process on a case-by-case base.
+
+The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 2 mitigation status is:
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  - Kernel status:
+
+  ====================================  =================================
+  'Not affected'                        The processor is not vulnerable
+  'Vulnerable'                          Vulnerable, no mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline'  Software-focused mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline'      AMD-specific software mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS'           Hardware-focused mitigation
+  ====================================  =================================
+
+  - Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is
+    used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only).
+
+  ========== =============================================================
+  'IBRS_FW'  Protection against user program attacks when calling firmware
+  ========== =============================================================
+
+  - Indirect branch prediction barrier (IBPB) status for protection between
+    processes of different users. This feature can be controlled through
+    prctl() per process, or through kernel command line options. This is
+    an x86 only feature. For more details see below.
+
+  ===================   ========================================================
+  'IBPB: disabled'      IBPB unused
+  'IBPB: always-on'     Use IBPB on all tasks
+  'IBPB: conditional'   Use IBPB on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks
+  ===================   ========================================================
+
+  - Single threaded indirect branch prediction (STIBP) status for protection
+    between different hyper threads. This feature can be controlled through
+    prctl per process, or through kernel command line options. This is x86
+    only feature. For more details see below.
+
+  ====================  ========================================================
+  'STIBP: disabled'     STIBP unused
+  'STIBP: forced'       Use STIBP on all tasks
+  'STIBP: conditional'  Use STIBP on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks
+  ====================  ========================================================
+
+  - Return stack buffer (RSB) protection status:
+
+  =============   ===========================================
+  'RSB filling'   Protection of RSB on context switch enabled
+  =============   ===========================================
+
+Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
+vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
+report vulnerability.
+
+Turning on mitigation for Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2
+-----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+1. Kernel mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Spectre variant 1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined
+   by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case
+   basis to use nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping :ref:`[2]
+   <spec_ref2>` to avoid any usable disclosure gadgets. However, it may
+   not cover all attack vectors for Spectre variant 1.
+
+   Copy-from-user code has an LFENCE barrier to prevent the access_ok()
+   check from being mis-speculated.  The barrier is done by the
+   barrier_nospec() macro.
+
+   For the swapgs variant of Spectre variant 1, LFENCE barriers are
+   added to interrupt, exception and NMI entry where needed.  These
+   barriers are done by the FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY and
+   FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY macros.
+
+Spectre variant 2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, the compiler turns indirect calls or
+   jumps in the kernel into equivalent return trampolines (retpolines)
+   :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` to go to the target
+   addresses.  Speculative execution paths under retpolines are trapped
+   in an infinite loop to prevent any speculative execution jumping to
+   a gadget.
+
+   To turn on retpoline mitigation on a vulnerable CPU, the kernel
+   needs to be compiled with a gcc compiler that supports the
+   -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options.
+   If the kernel is compiled with a Clang compiler, the compiler needs
+   to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option.  The kernel config
+   CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs to run with
+   the latest updated microcode.
+
+   On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all,
+   cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details.
+
+   On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. Enhanced
+   IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time.
+
+   The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable
+   CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator
+   via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+   On x86, indirect branch restricted speculation is turned on by default
+   before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
+   using the firmware.
+
+   Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y
+   and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
+   attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
+
+2. User program mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   User programs can mitigate Spectre variant 1 using LFENCE or "bounds
+   clipping". For more details see :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>`.
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, individual user programs
+   can be compiled with return trampolines for indirect branches.
+   This protects them from consuming poisoned entries in the branch
+   target buffer left by malicious software.  Alternatively, the
+   programs can disable their indirect branch speculation via prctl()
+   (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+   On x86, this will turn on STIBP to guard against attacks from the
+   sibling thread when the user program is running, and use IBPB to
+   flush the branch target buffer when switching to/from the program.
+
+   Restricting indirect branch speculation on a user program will
+   also prevent the program from launching a variant 2 attack
+   on x86.  All sand-boxed SECCOMP programs have indirect branch
+   speculation restricted by default.  Administrators can change
+   that behavior via the kernel command line and sysfs control files.
+   See :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+   Programs that disable their indirect branch speculation will have
+   more overhead and run slower.
+
+   User programs should use address space randomization
+   (/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2) to make attacks more
+   difficult.
+
+3. VM mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Within the kernel, Spectre variant 1 attacks from rogue guests are
+   mitigated on a case by case basis in VM exit paths. Vulnerable code
+   uses nospec accessor macros for "bounds clipping", to avoid any
+   usable disclosure gadgets.  However, this may not cover all variant
+   1 attack vectors.
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 attacks from rogue guests to the kernel, the
+   Linux kernel uses retpoline or Enhanced IBRS to prevent consumption of
+   poisoned entries in branch target buffer left by rogue guests.  It also
+   flushes the return stack buffer on every VM exit to prevent a return
+   stack buffer underflow so poisoned branch target buffer could be used,
+   or attacker guests leaving poisoned entries in the return stack buffer.
+
+   To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks in the same CPU hardware thread,
+   the branch target buffer is sanitized by flushing before switching
+   to a new guest on a CPU.
+
+   The above mitigations are turned on by default on vulnerable CPUs.
+
+   To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks from sibling thread when SMT is
+   in use, an untrusted guest running in the sibling thread can have
+   its indirect branch speculation disabled by administrator via prctl().
+
+   The kernel also allows guests to use any microcode based mitigation
+   they choose to use (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) to protect themselves.
+
+.. _spectre_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the
+kernel command line.
+
+	nospectre_v1
+
+		[X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
+		(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are
+		possible in the system.
+
+	nospectre_v2
+
+		[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
+		(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
+		allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
+		to spectre_v2=off.
+
+
+        spectre_v2=
+
+		[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+		(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+		The default operation protects the kernel from
+		user space attacks.
+
+		on
+			unconditionally enable, implies
+			spectre_v2_user=on
+		off
+			unconditionally disable, implies
+		        spectre_v2_user=off
+		auto
+			kernel detects whether your CPU model is
+		        vulnerable
+
+		Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
+		mitigation method at run time according to the
+		CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
+		CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
+		compiler with which the kernel was built.
+
+		Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
+		against user space to user space task attacks.
+
+		Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
+		the user space protections.
+
+		Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
+
+		retpoline
+					replace indirect branches
+		retpoline,generic
+					google's original retpoline
+		retpoline,amd
+					AMD-specific minimal thunk
+
+		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+		spectre_v2=auto.
+
+For user space mitigation:
+
+        spectre_v2_user=
+
+		[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+		(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between
+		user space tasks
+
+		on
+			Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is
+			enforced by spectre_v2=on
+
+		off
+			Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
+			enforced by spectre_v2=off
+
+		prctl
+			Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
+			but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
+			per thread. The mitigation control state
+			is inherited on fork.
+
+		prctl,ibpb
+			Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
+			controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+			always when switching between different user
+			space processes.
+
+		seccomp
+			Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
+			threads will enable the mitigation unless
+			they explicitly opt out.
+
+		seccomp,ibpb
+			Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
+			controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+			always when switching between different
+			user space processes.
+
+		auto
+			Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
+			the available CPU features and vulnerability.
+
+		Default mitigation:
+		If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
+		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+		spectre_v2_user=auto.
+
+		In general the kernel by default selects
+		reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To
+		disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with
+		spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
+		cannot be disabled.
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If all userspace applications are from trusted sources and do not
+   execute externally supplied untrusted code, then the mitigations can
+   be disabled.
+
+2. Protect sensitive programs
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   For security-sensitive programs that have secrets (e.g. crypto
+   keys), protection against Spectre variant 2 can be put in place by
+   disabling indirect branch speculation when the program is running
+   (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+
+3. Sandbox untrusted programs
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Untrusted programs that could be a source of attacks can be cordoned
+   off by disabling their indirect branch speculation when they are run
+   (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+   This prevents untrusted programs from polluting the branch target
+   buffer.  All programs running in SECCOMP sandboxes have indirect
+   branch speculation restricted by default. This behavior can be
+   changed via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+3. High security mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   All Spectre variant 2 mitigations can be forced on
+   at boot time for all programs (See the "on" option in
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`).  This will add
+   overhead as indirect branch speculations for all programs will be
+   restricted.
+
+   On x86, branch target buffer will be flushed with IBPB when switching
+   to a new program. STIBP is left on all the time to protect programs
+   against variant 2 attacks originating from programs running on
+   sibling threads.
+
+   Alternatively, STIBP can be used only when running programs
+   whose indirect branch speculation is explicitly disabled,
+   while IBPB is still used all the time when switching to a new
+   program to clear the branch target buffer (See "ibpb" option in
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`).  This "ibpb" option
+   has less performance cost than the "on" option, which leaves STIBP
+   on all the time.
+
+References on Spectre
+---------------------
+
+Intel white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref1:
+
+[1] `Intel analysis of speculative execution side channels <https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/Intel-Analysis-of-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channels.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref2:
+
+[2] `Bounds check bypass <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/bounds-check-bypass>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref3:
+
+[3] `Deep dive: Retpoline: A branch target injection mitigation <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-retpoline-branch-target-injection-mitigation>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref4:
+
+[4] `Deep Dive: Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-single-thread-indirect-branch-predictors>`_.
+
+AMD white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref5:
+
+[5] `AMD64 technology indirect branch control extension <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref6:
+
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
+
+ARM white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref7:
+
+[7] `Cache speculation side-channels <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/download-the-whitepaper>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref8:
+
+[8] `Cache speculation issues update <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/latest-updates/cache-speculation-issues-update>`_.
+
+Google white paper:
+
+.. _spec_ref9:
+
+[9] `Retpoline: a software construct for preventing branch-target-injection <https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886>`_.
+
+MIPS white paper:
+
+.. _spec_ref10:
+
+[10] `MIPS: response on speculative execution and side channel vulnerabilities <https://www.mips.com/blog/mips-response-on-speculative-execution-and-side-channel-vulnerabilities/>`_.
+
+Academic papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref11:
+
+[11] `Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution <https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref12:
+
+[12] `NetSpectre: Read Arbitrary Memory over Network <https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.10535>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref13:
+
+[13] `Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack Buffer <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot18/woot18-paper-koruyeh.pdf>`_.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..af6865b822d2
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+TAA - TSX Asynchronous Abort
+======================================
+
+TAA is a hardware vulnerability that allows unprivileged speculative access to
+data which is available in various CPU internal buffers by using asynchronous
+aborts within an Intel TSX transactional region.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability only affects Intel processors that support Intel
+Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) when the TAA_NO bit (bit 8)
+is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.  On processors where the MDS_NO bit
+(bit 5) is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR, the existing MDS mitigations
+also mitigate against TAA.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the TAA
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`tsx_async_abort_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this TAA issue:
+
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+   CVE-2019-11135  TAA    TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA) condition on some
+                          microprocessors utilizing speculative execution may
+                          allow an authenticated user to potentially enable
+                          information disclosure via a side channel with
+                          local access.
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+When performing store, load or L1 refill operations, processors write
+data into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in
+those buffers can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
+
+Intel TSX is an extension to the x86 instruction set architecture that adds
+hardware transactional memory support to improve performance of multi-threaded
+software. TSX lets the processor expose and exploit concurrency hidden in an
+application due to dynamically avoiding unnecessary synchronization.
+
+TSX supports atomic memory transactions that are either committed (success) or
+aborted. During an abort, operations that happened within the transactional region
+are rolled back. An asynchronous abort takes place, among other options, when a
+different thread accesses a cache line that is also used within the transactional
+region when that access might lead to a data race.
+
+Immediately after an uncompleted asynchronous abort, certain speculatively
+executed loads may read data from those internal buffers and pass it to dependent
+operations. This can be then used to infer the value via a cache side channel
+attack.
+
+Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
+Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
+
+The victim of a malicious actor does not need to make use of TSX. Only the
+attacker needs to begin a TSX transaction and raise an asynchronous abort
+which in turn potenitally leaks data stored in the buffers.
+
+More detailed technical information is available in the TAA specific x86
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst <tsx_async_abort>`.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the TAA vulnerability can be implemented from unprivileged
+applications running on hosts or guests.
+
+As for MDS, the attacker has no control over the memory addresses that can
+be leaked. Only the victim is responsible for bringing data to the CPU. As
+a result, the malicious actor has to sample as much data as possible and
+then postprocess it to try to infer any useful information from it.
+
+A potential attacker only has read access to the data. Also, there is no direct
+privilege escalation by using this technique.
+
+
+.. _tsx_async_abort_sys_info:
+
+TAA system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current TAA status
+of mitigated systems. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+   * - 'Vulnerable'
+     - The CPU is affected by this vulnerability and the microcode and kernel mitigation are not applied.
+   * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
+     - The system tries to clear the buffers but the microcode might not support the operation.
+   * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
+     - The microcode has been updated to clear the buffers. TSX is still enabled.
+   * - 'Mitigation: TSX disabled'
+     - TSX is disabled.
+   * - 'Not affected'
+     - The CPU is not affected by this issue.
+
+.. _ucode_needed:
+
+Best effort mitigation mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode-based
+mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
+effort mitigation mode.  This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
+without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
+
+This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
+microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the
+CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection takes
+effect; otherwise a few CPU cycles are wasted pointlessly.
+
+The state in the tsx_async_abort sysfs file reflects this situation
+accordingly.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+--------------------
+
+The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode which is
+required. If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
+enables the mitigation by default.
+
+
+The mitigation can be controlled at boot time via a kernel command line option.
+See :ref:`taa_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+.. _virt_mechanism:
+
+Virtualization mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Affected systems where the host has TAA microcode and TAA is mitigated by
+having disabled TSX previously, are not vulnerable regardless of the status
+of the VMs.
+
+In all other cases, if the host either does not have the TAA microcode or
+the kernel is not mitigated, the system might be vulnerable.
+
+
+.. _taa_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the TAA mitigations at boot time with
+the option "tsx_async_abort=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  off		This option disables the TAA mitigation on affected platforms.
+                If the system has TSX enabled (see next parameter) and the CPU
+                is affected, the system is vulnerable.
+
+  full	        TAA mitigation is enabled. If TSX is enabled, on an affected
+                system it will clear CPU buffers on ring transitions. On
+                systems which are MDS-affected and deploy MDS mitigation,
+                TAA is also mitigated. Specifying this option on those
+                systems will have no effect.
+
+  full,nosmt    The same as tsx_async_abort=full, with SMT disabled on
+                vulnerable CPUs that have TSX enabled. This is the complete
+                mitigation. When TSX is disabled, SMT is not disabled because
+                CPU is not vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx_async_abort=full". For
+processors that are affected by both TAA and MDS, specifying just
+"tsx_async_abort=off" without an accompanying "mds=off" will have no
+effect as the same mitigation is used for both vulnerabilities.
+
+The kernel command line also allows to control the TSX feature using the
+parameter "tsx=" on CPUs which support TSX control. MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is used
+to control the TSX feature and the enumeration of the TSX feature bits (RTM
+and HLE) in CPUID.
+
+The valid options are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  off		Disables TSX on the system.
+
+                Note that this option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
+                not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1
+                and which get the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
+                update. This new MSR allows for the reliable deactivation of
+                the TSX functionality.
+
+  on		Enables TSX.
+
+                Although there are mitigations for all known security
+                vulnerabilities, TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
+                several previous speculation-related CVEs, and so there may be
+                unknown security risks associated with leaving it enabled.
+
+  auto		Disables TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enables TSX
+                on the system.
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx=off".
+
+The following combinations of the "tsx_async_abort" and "tsx" are possible. For
+affected platforms tsx=auto is equivalent to tsx=off and the result will be:
+
+  =========  ==========================   =========================================
+  tsx=on     tsx_async_abort=full         The system will use VERW to clear CPU
+                                          buffers. Cross-thread attacks are still
+					  possible on SMT machines.
+  tsx=on     tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt   As above, cross-thread attacks on SMT
+                                          mitigated.
+  tsx=on     tsx_async_abort=off          The system is vulnerable.
+  tsx=off    tsx_async_abort=full         TSX might be disabled if microcode
+                                          provides a TSX control MSR. If so,
+					  system is not vulnerable.
+  tsx=off    tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt   Ditto
+  tsx=off    tsx_async_abort=off          ditto
+  =========  ==========================   =========================================
+
+
+For unaffected platforms "tsx=on" and "tsx_async_abort=full" does not clear CPU
+buffers.  For platforms without TSX control (MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=0)
+"tsx" command line argument has no effect.
+
+For the affected platforms below table indicates the mitigation status for the
+combinations of CPUID bit MD_CLEAR and IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bits MDS_NO
+and TSX_CTRL_MSR.
+
+  =======  =========  =============  ========================================
+  MDS_NO   MD_CLEAR   TSX_CTRL_MSR   Status
+  =======  =========  =============  ========================================
+    0          0            0        Vulnerable (needs microcode)
+    0          1            0        MDS and TAA mitigated via VERW
+    1          1            0        MDS fixed, TAA vulnerable if TSX enabled
+                                     because MD_CLEAR has no meaning and
+                                     VERW is not guaranteed to clear buffers
+    1          X            1        MDS fixed, TAA can be mitigated by
+                                     VERW or TSX_CTRL_MSR
+  =======  =========  =============  ========================================
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace and guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If all user space applications are from a trusted source and do not execute
+untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation can be
+disabled. The same applies to virtualized environments with trusted guests.
+
+
+2. Untrusted userspace and guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If there are untrusted applications or guests on the system, enabling TSX
+might allow a malicious actor to leak data from the host or from other
+processes running on the same physical core.
+
+If the microcode is available and the TSX is disabled on the host, attacks
+are prevented in a virtualized environment as well, even if the VMs do not
+explicitly enable the mitigation.
+
+
+.. _taa_default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+The kernel's default action for vulnerable processors is:
+
+  - Deploy TSX disable mitigation (tsx_async_abort=full tsx=off).
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst
index 0873685bab0f..89abc5057349 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst
@@ -17,14 +17,12 @@ etc.
    kernel-parameters
    devices
 
-This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
-possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
-are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
+This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and their mitigations.
 
 .. toctree::
    :maxdepth: 1
 
-   l1tf
+   hw-vuln/index
 
 Here is a set of documents aimed at users who are trying to track down
 problems and bugs in particular.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 92eb1f42240d..6795e9d187d0 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@
 			the GPE dispatcher.
 			This facility can be used to prevent such uncontrolled
 			GPE floodings.
-			Format: <int>
+			Format: <byte>
 
 	acpi_no_auto_serialize	[HW,ACPI]
 			Disable auto-serialization of AML methods
@@ -136,6 +136,10 @@
 			dynamic table installation which will install SSDT
 			tables to /sys/firmware/acpi/tables/dynamic.
 
+	acpi_no_watchdog	[HW,ACPI,WDT]
+			Ignore the ACPI-based watchdog interface (WDAT) and let
+			a native driver control the watchdog device instead.
+
 	acpi_rsdp=	[ACPI,EFI,KEXEC]
 			Pass the RSDP address to the kernel, mostly used
 			on machines running EFI runtime service to boot the
@@ -554,7 +558,13 @@
 			loops can be debugged more effectively on production
 			systems.
 
-	clearcpuid=BITNUM [X86]
+	clocksource.max_cswd_read_retries= [KNL]
+			Number of clocksource_watchdog() retries due to
+			external delays before the clock will be marked
+			unstable.  Defaults to three retries, that is,
+			four attempts to read the clock under test.
+
+	clearcpuid=BITNUM[,BITNUM...] [X86]
 			Disable CPUID feature X for the kernel. See
 			arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h for the valid bit
 			numbers. Note the Linux specific bits are not necessarily
@@ -1063,7 +1073,7 @@
 			earlyprintk=serial[,0x...[,baudrate]]
 			earlyprintk=ttySn[,baudrate]
 			earlyprintk=dbgp[debugController#]
-			earlyprintk=pciserial,bus:device.function[,baudrate]
+			earlyprintk=pciserial[,force],bus:device.function[,baudrate]
 			earlyprintk=xdbc[xhciController#]
 
 			earlyprintk is useful when the kernel crashes before
@@ -1095,6 +1105,10 @@
 
 			The sclp output can only be used on s390.
 
+			The optional "force" to "pciserial" enables use of a
+			PCI device even when its classcode is not of the
+			UART class.
+
 	edac_report=	[HW,EDAC] Control how to report EDAC event
 			Format: {"on" | "off" | "force"}
 			on: enable EDAC to report H/W event. May be overridden
@@ -1942,6 +1956,12 @@
 			Built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF=y,
 			the default is off.
 
+	kpti=		[ARM64] Control page table isolation of user
+			and kernel address spaces.
+			Default: enabled on cores which need mitigation.
+			0: force disabled
+			1: force enabled
+
 	kvm.ignore_msrs=[KVM] Ignore guest accesses to unhandled MSRs.
 			Default is 0 (don't ignore, but inject #GP)
 
@@ -1952,6 +1972,25 @@
 			KVM MMU at runtime.
 			Default is 0 (off)
 
+	kvm.nx_huge_pages=
+			[KVM] Controls the software workaround for the
+			X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT bug.
+			force	: Always deploy workaround.
+			off	: Never deploy workaround.
+			auto    : Deploy workaround based on the presence of
+				  X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT.
+
+			Default is 'auto'.
+
+			If the software workaround is enabled for the host,
+			guests do need not to enable it for nested guests.
+
+	kvm.nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio=
+			[KVM] Controls how many 4KiB pages are periodically zapped
+			back to huge pages.  0 disables the recovery, otherwise if
+			the value is N KVM will zap 1/Nth of the 4KiB pages every
+			minute.  The default is 60.
+
 	kvm-amd.nested=	[KVM,AMD] Allow nested virtualization in KVM/SVM.
 			Default is 1 (enabled)
 
@@ -2069,10 +2108,13 @@
 			off
 				Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't
 				emit any warnings.
+				It also drops the swap size and available
+				RAM limit restriction on both hypervisor and
+				bare metal.
 
 			Default is 'flush'.
 
-			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
 
 	l2cr=		[PPC]
 
@@ -2312,6 +2354,38 @@
 			Format: <first>,<last>
 			Specifies range of consoles to be captured by the MDA.
 
+	mds=		[X86,INTEL]
+			Control mitigation for the Micro-architectural Data
+			Sampling (MDS) vulnerability.
+
+			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against CPU
+			internal buffers which can forward information to a
+			disclosure gadget under certain conditions.
+
+			In vulnerable processors, the speculatively
+			forwarded data can be used in a cache side channel
+			attack, to access data to which the attacker does
+			not have direct access.
+
+			This parameter controls the MDS mitigation. The
+			options are:
+
+			full       - Enable MDS mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+			full,nosmt - Enable MDS mitigation and disable
+				     SMT on vulnerable CPUs
+			off        - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation
+
+			On TAA-affected machines, mds=off can be prevented by
+			an active TAA mitigation as both vulnerabilities are
+			mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable
+			this mitigation, you need to specify tsx_async_abort=off
+			too.
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			mds=full.
+
+			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
+
 	mem=nn[KMG]	[KNL,BOOT] Force usage of a specific amount of memory
 			Amount of memory to be used when the kernel is not able
 			to see the whole system memory or for test.
@@ -2469,6 +2543,53 @@
 			in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
+	mitigations=
+			[X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] Control optional mitigations for
+			CPU vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			arch-independent options, each of which is an
+			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
+
+			off
+				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
+				improves system performance, but it may also
+				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       kpti=0 [ARM64]
+					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
+					       nobp=0 [S390]
+					       nospectre_v1 [X86]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
+					       l1tf=off [X86]
+					       mds=off [X86]
+					       tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
+					       kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
+					       no_entry_flush [PPC]
+					       no_uaccess_flush [PPC]
+
+				Exceptions:
+					       This does not have any effect on
+					       kvm.nx_huge_pages when
+					       kvm.nx_huge_pages=force.
+
+			auto (default)
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
+				enabled, even if it's vulnerable.  This is for
+				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
+				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
+				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
+				Equivalent to: (default behavior)
+
+			auto,nosmt
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
+				if needed.  This is for users who always want to
+				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+				Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
+					       mds=full,nosmt [X86]
+					       tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt [X86]
+
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
 			parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for
@@ -2757,6 +2878,8 @@
 
 	noefi		Disable EFI runtime services support.
 
+	no_entry_flush  [PPC] Don't flush the L1-D cache when entering the kernel.
+
 	noexec		[IA-64]
 
 	noexec		[X86]
@@ -2794,18 +2917,21 @@
 			nosmt=force: Force disable SMT, cannot be undone
 				     via the sysfs control file.
 
-	nospectre_v1	[PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 (bounds
-			check bypass). With this option data leaks are possible
-			in the system.
+	nospectre_v1	[X66, PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
+			(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks
+			are possible in the system.
 
-	nospectre_v2	[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
-			(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
-			allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
-			to spectre_v2=off.
+	nospectre_v2	[X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E,ARM64] Disable all mitigations for
+			the Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch prediction)
+			vulnerability. System may allow data leaks with this
+			option.
 
 	nospec_store_bypass_disable
 			[HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
 
+	no_uaccess_flush
+	                [PPC] Don't flush the L1-D cache after accessing user data.
+
 	noxsave		[BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
 			and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
 			enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
@@ -3880,6 +4006,13 @@
 			Run specified binary instead of /init from the ramdisk,
 			used for early userspace startup. See initrd.
 
+	rdrand=		[X86]
+			force - Override the decision by the kernel to hide the
+				advertisement of RDRAND support (this affects
+				certain AMD processors because of buggy BIOS
+				support, specifically around the suspend/resume
+				path).
+
 	rdt=		[HW,X86,RDT]
 			Turn on/off individual RDT features. List is:
 			cmt, mbmtotal, mbmlocal, l3cat, l3cdp, l2cat, l2cdp,
@@ -4165,9 +4298,13 @@
 
 	spectre_v2=	[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+			The default operation protects the kernel from
+			user space attacks.
 
-			on   - unconditionally enable
-			off  - unconditionally disable
+			on   - unconditionally enable, implies
+			       spectre_v2_user=on
+			off  - unconditionally disable, implies
+			       spectre_v2_user=off
 			auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
 			       vulnerable
 
@@ -4177,6 +4314,12 @@
 			CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
 			compiler with which the kernel was built.
 
+			Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
+			against user space to user space task attacks.
+
+			Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
+			the user space protections.
+
 			Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
 
 			retpoline	  - replace indirect branches
@@ -4186,6 +4329,48 @@
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			spectre_v2=auto.
 
+	spectre_v2_user=
+			[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+		        (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between
+		        user space tasks
+
+			on	- Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is
+				  enforced by spectre_v2=on
+
+			off     - Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
+				  enforced by spectre_v2=off
+
+			prctl   - Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
+				  but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
+				  per thread.  The mitigation control state
+				  is inherited on fork.
+
+			prctl,ibpb
+				- Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
+				  controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+				  always when switching between different user
+				  space processes.
+
+			seccomp
+				- Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
+				  threads will enable the mitigation unless
+				  they explicitly opt out.
+
+			seccomp,ibpb
+				- Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
+				  controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+				  always when switching between different
+				  user space processes.
+
+			auto    - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
+				  the available CPU features and vulnerability.
+
+			Default mitigation:
+			If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			spectre_v2_user=auto.
+
 	spec_store_bypass_disable=
 			[HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation
 			(Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability)
@@ -4243,6 +4428,26 @@
 	spia_pedr=
 	spia_peddr=
 
+	srbds=		[X86,INTEL]
+			Control the Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+			(SRBDS) mitigation.
+
+			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an MDS-like
+			exploit which can leak bits from the random
+			number generator.
+
+			By default, this issue is mitigated by
+			microcode.  However, the microcode fix can cause
+			the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions to become
+			much slower.  Among other effects, this will
+			result in reduced throughput from /dev/urandom.
+
+			The microcode mitigation can be disabled with
+			the following option:
+
+			off:    Disable mitigation and remove
+				performance impact to RDRAND and RDSEED
+
 	srcutree.counter_wrap_check [KNL]
 			Specifies how frequently to check for
 			grace-period sequence counter wrap for the
@@ -4561,6 +4766,76 @@
 			marks the TSC unconditionally unstable at bootup and
 			avoids any further wobbles once the TSC watchdog notices.
 
+	tsx=		[X86] Control Transactional Synchronization
+			Extensions (TSX) feature in Intel processors that
+			support TSX control.
+
+			This parameter controls the TSX feature. The options are:
+
+			on	- Enable TSX on the system. Although there are
+				mitigations for all known security vulnerabilities,
+				TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
+				several previous speculation-related CVEs, and
+				so there may be unknown	security risks associated
+				with leaving it enabled.
+
+			off	- Disable TSX on the system. (Note that this
+				option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
+				not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have
+				MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1 and which get
+				the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
+				update. This new MSR allows for the reliable
+				deactivation of the TSX functionality.)
+
+			auto	- Disable TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present,
+				  otherwise enable TSX on the system.
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to tsx=off.
+
+			See Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
+			for more details.
+
+	tsx_async_abort= [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the TSX Async
+			Abort (TAA) vulnerability.
+
+			Similar to Micro-architectural Data Sampling (MDS)
+			certain CPUs that support Transactional
+			Synchronization Extensions (TSX) are vulnerable to an
+			exploit against CPU internal buffers which can forward
+			information to a disclosure gadget under certain
+			conditions.
+
+			In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded
+			data can be used in a cache side channel attack, to
+			access data to which the attacker does not have direct
+			access.
+
+			This parameter controls the TAA mitigation.  The
+			options are:
+
+			full       - Enable TAA mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+				     if TSX is enabled.
+
+			full,nosmt - Enable TAA mitigation and disable SMT on
+				     vulnerable CPUs. If TSX is disabled, SMT
+				     is not disabled because CPU is not
+				     vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
+			off        - Unconditionally disable TAA mitigation
+
+			On MDS-affected machines, tsx_async_abort=off can be
+			prevented by an active MDS mitigation as both vulnerabilities
+			are mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable
+			this mitigation, you need to specify mds=off too.
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			tsx_async_abort=full.  On CPUs which are MDS affected
+			and deploy MDS mitigation, TAA mitigation is not
+			required and doesn't provide any additional
+			mitigation.
+
+			For details see:
+			Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
+
 	turbografx.map[2|3]=	[HW,JOY]
 			TurboGraFX parallel port interface
 			Format:
@@ -4683,6 +4958,8 @@
 					prevent spurious wakeup);
 				n = USB_QUIRK_DELAY_CTRL_MSG (Device needs a
 					pause after every control message);
+				o = USB_QUIRK_HUB_SLOW_RESET (Hub needs extra
+					delay after resetting its port);
 			Example: quirks=0781:5580:bk,0a5c:5834:gij
 
 	usbhid.mousepoll=
@@ -4707,13 +4984,13 @@
 			Flags is a set of characters, each corresponding
 			to a common usb-storage quirk flag as follows:
 				a = SANE_SENSE (collect more than 18 bytes
-					of sense data);
+					of sense data, not on uas);
 				b = BAD_SENSE (don't collect more than 18
-					bytes of sense data);
+					bytes of sense data, not on uas);
 				c = FIX_CAPACITY (decrease the reported
 					device capacity by one sector);
 				d = NO_READ_DISC_INFO (don't use
-					READ_DISC_INFO command);
+					READ_DISC_INFO command, not on uas);
 				e = NO_READ_CAPACITY_16 (don't use
 					READ_CAPACITY_16 command);
 				f = NO_REPORT_OPCODES (don't use report opcodes
@@ -4727,18 +5004,20 @@
 					device);
 				j = NO_REPORT_LUNS (don't use report luns
 					command, uas only);
+				k = NO_SAME (do not use WRITE_SAME, uas only)
 				l = NOT_LOCKABLE (don't try to lock and
-					unlock ejectable media);
+					unlock ejectable media, not on uas);
 				m = MAX_SECTORS_64 (don't transfer more
-					than 64 sectors = 32 KB at a time);
+					than 64 sectors = 32 KB at a time,
+					not on uas);
 				n = INITIAL_READ10 (force a retry of the
-					initial READ(10) command);
+					initial READ(10) command, not on uas);
 				o = CAPACITY_OK (accept the capacity
-					reported by the device);
+					reported by the device, not on uas);
 				p = WRITE_CACHE (the device cache is ON
-					by default);
+					by default, not on uas);
 				r = IGNORE_RESIDUE (the device reports
-					bogus residue values);
+					bogus residue values, not on uas);
 				s = SINGLE_LUN (the device has only one
 					Logical Unit);
 				t = NO_ATA_1X (don't allow ATA(12) and ATA(16)
@@ -4747,7 +5026,8 @@
 				w = NO_WP_DETECT (don't test whether the
 					medium is write-protected).
 				y = ALWAYS_SYNC (issue a SYNCHRONIZE_CACHE
-					even if the device claims no cache)
+					even if the device claims no cache,
+					not on uas)
 			Example: quirks=0419:aaf5:rl,0421:0433:rc
 
 	user_debug=	[KNL,ARM]
@@ -4855,12 +5135,6 @@
 			emulate     [default] Vsyscalls turn into traps and are
 			            emulated reasonably safely.
 
-			native      Vsyscalls are native syscall instructions.
-			            This is a little bit faster than trapping
-			            and makes a few dynamic recompilers work
-			            better than they would in emulation mode.
-			            It also makes exploits much easier to write.
-
 			none        Vsyscalls don't work at all.  This makes
 			            them quite hard to use for exploits but
 			            might break your system.
@@ -4992,6 +5266,10 @@
 				the unplug protocol
 			never -- do not unplug even if version check succeeds
 
+	xen_legacy_crash	[X86,XEN]
+			Crash from Xen panic notifier, without executing late
+			panic() code such as dumping handler.
+
 	xen_nopvspin	[X86,XEN]
 			Disables the ticketlock slowpath using Xen PV
 			optimizations.
@@ -5006,6 +5284,14 @@
 			with /sys/devices/system/xen_memory/xen_memory0/scrub_pages.
 			Default value controlled with CONFIG_XEN_SCRUB_PAGES_DEFAULT.
 
+	xen.event_eoi_delay=	[XEN]
+			How long to delay EOI handling in case of event
+			storms (jiffies). Default is 10.
+
+	xen.event_loop_timeout=	[XEN]
+			After which time (jiffies) the event handling loop
+			should start to delay EOI handling. Default is 2.
+
 	xirc2ps_cs=	[NET,PCMCIA]
 			Format:
 			<irq>,<irq_mask>,<io>,<full_duplex>,<do_sound>,<lockup_hack>[,<irq2>[,<irq3>[,<irq4>]]]
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst
index 30491d91e93d..30187d49dc2c 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst
@@ -26,23 +26,35 @@ information is helpful.  Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
 be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
 made public.
 
-Disclosure
-----------
-
-The goal of the Linux kernel security team is to work with the bug
-submitter to understand and fix the bug.  We prefer to publish the fix as
-soon as possible, but try to avoid public discussion of the bug itself
-and leave that to others.
-
-Publishing the fix may be delayed when the bug or the fix is not yet
-fully understood, the solution is not well-tested or for vendor
-coordination.  However, we expect these delays to be short, measurable in
-days, not weeks or months.  A release date is negotiated by the security
-team working with the bug submitter as well as vendors.  However, the
-kernel security team holds the final say when setting a timeframe.  The
-timeframe varies from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known bug)
-to a few weeks.  As a basic default policy, we expect report date to
-release date to be on the order of 7 days.
+Disclosure and embargoed information
+------------------------------------
+
+The security list is not a disclosure channel.  For that, see Coordination
+below.
+
+Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts.  Fixes
+for publicly known bugs are released immediately.
+
+Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs
+as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of
+the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start
+of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days
+if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time.  The
+only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate
+the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release
+coordination.
+
+Whilst embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in
+order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside
+the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the
+reporter.  This includes but is not limited to the original bug report
+and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the
+identity of the reporter.
+
+In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed.  All other
+information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions
+of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been
+lifted, in perpetuity.
 
 Coordination
 ------------
@@ -68,7 +80,7 @@ may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
 assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private
 linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known
 before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit
-message, though.
+message if the reporter agrees.
 
 Non-disclosure agreements
 -------------------------
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/arm/kernel_mode_neon.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/arm/kernel_mode_neon.txt
index 525452726d31..b9e060c5b61e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/arm/kernel_mode_neon.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/arm/kernel_mode_neon.txt
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ TL;DR summary
 * Use only NEON instructions, or VFP instructions that don't rely on support
   code
 * Isolate your NEON code in a separate compilation unit, and compile it with
-  '-mfpu=neon -mfloat-abi=softfp'
+  '-march=armv7-a -mfpu=neon -mfloat-abi=softfp'
 * Put kernel_neon_begin() and kernel_neon_end() calls around the calls into your
   NEON code
 * Don't sleep in your NEON code, and be aware that it will be executed with
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ instructions appearing in unexpected places if no special care is taken.
 Therefore, the recommended and only supported way of using NEON/VFP in the
 kernel is by adhering to the following rules:
 * isolate the NEON code in a separate compilation unit and compile it with
-  '-mfpu=neon -mfloat-abi=softfp';
+  '-march=armv7-a -mfpu=neon -mfloat-abi=softfp';
 * issue the calls to kernel_neon_begin(), kernel_neon_end() as well as the calls
   into the unit containing the NEON code from a compilation unit which is *not*
   built with the GCC flag '-mfpu=neon' set.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.txt
index d6aff2c5e9e2..6feaffe90e22 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.txt
@@ -178,3 +178,7 @@ HWCAP_ILRCPC
 HWCAP_FLAGM
 
     Functionality implied by ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1.TS == 0b0001.
+
+HWCAP_SSBS
+
+    Functionality implied by ID_AA64PFR1_EL1.SSBS == 0b0010.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt
index 3b2f2dd82225..667ea906266e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ stable kernels.
 
 | Implementor    | Component       | Erratum ID      | Kconfig                     |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| Allwinner      | A64/R18         | UNKNOWN1        | SUN50I_ERRATUM_UNKNOWN1     |
+|                |                 |                 |                             |
 | ARM            | Cortex-A53      | #826319         | ARM64_ERRATUM_826319        |
 | ARM            | Cortex-A53      | #827319         | ARM64_ERRATUM_827319        |
 | ARM            | Cortex-A53      | #824069         | ARM64_ERRATUM_824069        |
@@ -56,6 +58,8 @@ stable kernels.
 | ARM            | Cortex-A72      | #853709         | N/A                         |
 | ARM            | Cortex-A73      | #858921         | ARM64_ERRATUM_858921        |
 | ARM            | Cortex-A55      | #1024718        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1024718       |
+| ARM            | Cortex-A76      | #1463225        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1463225       |
+| ARM            | Neoverse-N1     | #1542419        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1542419       |
 | ARM            | MMU-500         | #841119,#826419 | N/A                         |
 |                |                 |                 |                             |
 | Cavium         | ThunderX ITS    | #22375, #24313  | CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375        |
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/atomic_t.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/atomic_t.txt
index 913396ac5824..ed0d814df7e0 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/atomic_t.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/atomic_t.txt
@@ -177,6 +177,9 @@ These helper barriers exist because architectures have varying implicit
 ordering on their SMP atomic primitives. For example our TSO architectures
 provide full ordered atomics and these barriers are no-ops.
 
+NOTE: when the atomic RmW ops are fully ordered, they should also imply a
+compiler barrier.
+
 Thus:
 
   atomic_fetch_add();
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/conf.py linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/conf.py
index b691af4831fa..22c1a6d96f9e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/conf.py
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/conf.py
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ needs_sphinx = '1.3'
 extensions = ['kerneldoc', 'rstFlatTable', 'kernel_include', 'cdomain', 'kfigure', 'sphinx.ext.ifconfig']
 
 # The name of the math extension changed on Sphinx 1.4
-if major == 1 and minor > 3:
+if (major == 1 and minor > 3) or (major > 1):
     extensions.append("sphinx.ext.imgmath")
 else:
     extensions.append("sphinx.ext.pngmath")
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/device-mapper/dm-integrity.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/device-mapper/dm-integrity.txt
index 297251b0d2d5..bf6af2ade0a6 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/device-mapper/dm-integrity.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/device-mapper/dm-integrity.txt
@@ -146,6 +146,13 @@ block_size:number
 	Supported values are 512, 1024, 2048 and 4096 bytes.  If not
 	specified the default block size is 512 bytes.
 
+legacy_recalculate
+	Allow recalculating of volumes with HMAC keys. This is disabled by
+	default for security reasons - an attacker could modify the volume,
+	set recalc_sector to zero, and the kernel would not detect the
+	modification.
+
+
 The journal mode (D/J), buffer_sectors, journal_watermark, commit_time can
 be changed when reloading the target (load an inactive table and swap the
 tables with suspend and resume). The other arguments should not be changed
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/bus/ti-sysc.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/bus/ti-sysc.txt
index 91dc2333af01..85a23f551f02 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/bus/ti-sysc.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/bus/ti-sysc.txt
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ Required standard properties:
 		"ti,sysc-omap3-sham"
 		"ti,sysc-omap-aes"
 		"ti,sysc-mcasp"
+		"ti,sysc-dra7-mcasp"
 		"ti,sysc-usb-host-fs"
 		"ti,sysc-dra7-mcan"
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/renesas,rcar-usb2-clock-sel.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/renesas,rcar-usb2-clock-sel.txt
index e96e085271c1..83f6c6a7c41c 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/renesas,rcar-usb2-clock-sel.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/renesas,rcar-usb2-clock-sel.txt
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Required properties:
 Example (R-Car H3):
 
 	usb2_clksel: clock-controller@e6590630 {
-		compatible = "renesas,r8a77950-rcar-usb2-clock-sel",
+		compatible = "renesas,r8a7795-rcar-usb2-clock-sel",
 			     "renesas,rcar-gen3-usb2-clock-sel";
 		reg = <0 0xe6590630 0 0x02>;
 		clocks = <&cpg CPG_MOD 703>, <&usb_extal>, <&usb_xtal>;
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/mediatek/mediatek,dpi.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/mediatek/mediatek,dpi.txt
index b6a7e7397b8b..b944fe067188 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/mediatek/mediatek,dpi.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/mediatek/mediatek,dpi.txt
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ Required properties:
   Documentation/devicetree/bindings/graph.txt. This port should be connected
   to the input port of an attached HDMI or LVDS encoder chip.
 
+Optional properties:
+- pinctrl-names: Contain "default" and "sleep".
+
 Example:
 
 dpi0: dpi@1401d000 {
@@ -26,6 +29,9 @@ dpi0: dpi@1401d000 {
 		 <&mmsys CLK_MM_DPI_ENGINE>,
 		 <&apmixedsys CLK_APMIXED_TVDPLL>;
 	clock-names = "pixel", "engine", "pll";
+	pinctrl-names = "default", "sleep";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&dpi_pin_func>;
+	pinctrl-1 = <&dpi_pin_idle>;
 
 	port {
 		dpi0_out: endpoint {
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/panel/armadeus,st0700-adapt.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/panel/armadeus,st0700-adapt.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a30d63db3c8f
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/panel/armadeus,st0700-adapt.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+Armadeus ST0700 Adapt. A Santek ST0700I5Y-RBSLW 7.0" WVGA (800x480) TFT with
+an adapter board.
+
+Required properties:
+- compatible: "armadeus,st0700-adapt"
+- power-supply: see panel-common.txt
+
+Optional properties:
+- backlight: see panel-common.txt
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/eeprom/at24.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/eeprom/at24.txt
index aededdbc262b..f9a7c984274c 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/eeprom/at24.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/eeprom/at24.txt
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ Required properties:
                 "atmel,24c256",
                 "atmel,24c512",
                 "atmel,24c1024",
+                "atmel,24c2048",
 
                 If <manufacturer> is not "atmel", then a fallback must be used
                 with the same <model> and "atmel" as manufacturer.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/adc/samsung,exynos-adc.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/adc/samsung,exynos-adc.txt
index 6c49db7f8ad2..e1fe02f3e3e9 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/adc/samsung,exynos-adc.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/adc/samsung,exynos-adc.txt
@@ -11,11 +11,13 @@ New driver handles the following
 
 Required properties:
 - compatible:		Must be "samsung,exynos-adc-v1"
-				for exynos4412/5250 and s5pv210 controllers.
+				for Exynos5250 controllers.
 			Must be "samsung,exynos-adc-v2" for
 				future controllers.
 			Must be "samsung,exynos3250-adc" for
 				controllers compatible with ADC of Exynos3250.
+			Must be "samsung,exynos4212-adc" for
+				controllers compatible with ADC of Exynos4212 and Exynos4412.
 			Must be "samsung,exynos7-adc" for
 				the ADC in Exynos7 and compatibles
 			Must be "samsung,s3c2410-adc" for
@@ -28,6 +30,8 @@ Required properties:
 				the ADC in s3c2443 and compatibles
 			Must be "samsung,s3c6410-adc" for
 				the ADC in s3c6410 and compatibles
+			Must be "samsung,s5pv210-adc" for
+				the ADC in s5pv210 and compatibles
 - reg:			List of ADC register address range
 			- The base address and range of ADC register
 			- The base address and range of ADC_PHY register (every
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/multiplexer/io-channel-mux.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/multiplexer/io-channel-mux.txt
index c82794002595..89647d714387 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/multiplexer/io-channel-mux.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/multiplexer/io-channel-mux.txt
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ controller state. The mux controller state is described in
 
 Example:
 	mux: mux-controller {
-		compatible = "mux-gpio";
+		compatible = "gpio-mux";
 		#mux-control-cells = <0>;
 
 		mux-gpios = <&pioA 0 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>,
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/media/i2c/adv748x.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/media/i2c/adv748x.txt
index 21ffb5ed8183..54d1d3bc1869 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/media/i2c/adv748x.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/media/i2c/adv748x.txt
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Example:
 			};
 		};
 
-		port@10 {
+		port@a {
 			reg = <10>;
 
 			adv7482_txa: endpoint {
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ Example:
 			};
 		};
 
-		port@11 {
+		port@b {
 			reg = <11>;
 
 			adv7482_txb: endpoint {
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/mmc/mmc.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/mmc/mmc.txt
index f5a0923b34ca..c269dbe384fe 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/mmc/mmc.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/mmc/mmc.txt
@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ Optional properties:
   be referred to mmc-pwrseq-simple.txt. But now it's reused as a tunable delay
   waiting for I/O signalling and card power supply to be stable, regardless of
   whether pwrseq-simple is used. Default to 10ms if no available.
+- supports-cqe : The presence of this property indicates that the corresponding
+  MMC host controller supports HW command queue feature.
+- disable-cqe-dcmd: This property indicates that the MMC controller's command
+  queue engine (CQE) does not support direct commands (DCMDs).
 
 *NOTE* on CD and WP polarity. To use common for all SD/MMC host controllers line
 polarity properties, we have to fix the meaning of the "normal" and "inverted"
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/brcm,unimac-mdio.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/brcm,unimac-mdio.txt
index 4648948f7c3b..e15589f47787 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/brcm,unimac-mdio.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/brcm,unimac-mdio.txt
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ Optional properties:
 - interrupt-names: must be "mdio_done_error" when there is a share interrupt fed
   to this hardware block, or must be "mdio_done" for the first interrupt and
   "mdio_error" for the second when there are separate interrupts
+- clocks: A reference to the clock supplying the MDIO bus controller
+- clock-frequency: the MDIO bus clock that must be output by the MDIO bus
+  hardware, if absent, the default hardware values are used
 
 Child nodes of this MDIO bus controller node are standard Ethernet PHY device
 nodes as described in Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/phy.txt
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/btusb.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/btusb.txt
index 37d67926dd6d..d883a35641d1 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/btusb.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/btusb.txt
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Following example uses irq pin number 3 of gpio0 for out of band wake-on-bt:
 	compatible = "usb1286,204e";
 	reg = <1>;
 	interrupt-parent = <&gpio0>;
-	interrupt-name = "wakeup";
+	interrupt-names = "wakeup";
 	interrupts = <3 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW>;
     };
 };
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/holt_hi311x.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/holt_hi311x.txt
index 903a78da65be..3a9926f99937 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/holt_hi311x.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/holt_hi311x.txt
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Example:
 		reg = <1>;
 		clocks = <&clk32m>;
 		interrupt-parent = <&gpio4>;
-		interrupts = <13 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING>;
+		interrupts = <13 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 		vdd-supply = <&reg5v0>;
 		xceiver-supply = <&reg5v0>;
 	};
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt
index 188c8bd4eb67..5a0111d4de58 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Required properties:
  - compatible: Should be one of the following:
    - "microchip,mcp2510" for MCP2510.
    - "microchip,mcp2515" for MCP2515.
+   - "microchip,mcp25625" for MCP25625.
  - reg: SPI chip select.
  - clocks: The clock feeding the CAN controller.
  - interrupts: Should contain IRQ line for the CAN controller.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/fsl-fman.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/fsl-fman.txt
index 299c0dcd67db..1316f0aec0cf 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/fsl-fman.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/fsl-fman.txt
@@ -110,6 +110,13 @@ PROPERTIES
 		Usage: required
 		Definition: See soc/fsl/qman.txt and soc/fsl/bman.txt
 
+- fsl,erratum-a050385
+		Usage: optional
+		Value type: boolean
+		Definition: A boolean property. Indicates the presence of the
+		erratum A050385 which indicates that DMA transactions that are
+		split can result in a FMan lock.
+
 =============================================================================
 FMan MURAM Node
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/marvell-orion-mdio.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/marvell-orion-mdio.txt
index 42cd81090a2c..3f3cfc1d8d4d 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/marvell-orion-mdio.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/marvell-orion-mdio.txt
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Required properties:
 
 Optional properties:
 - interrupts: interrupt line number for the SMI error/done interrupt
-- clocks: phandle for up to three required clocks for the MDIO instance
+- clocks: phandle for up to four required clocks for the MDIO instance
 
 The child nodes of the MDIO driver are the individual PHY devices
 connected to this MDIO bus. They must have a "reg" property given the
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/nxp-nci.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/nxp-nci.txt
index cfaf88998918..9e4dc510a40a 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/nxp-nci.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/nxp-nci.txt
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Example (for ARM-based BeagleBone with NPC100 NFC controller on I2C2):
 		clock-frequency = <100000>;
 
 		interrupt-parent = <&gpio1>;
-		interrupts = <29 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+		interrupts = <29 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 		enable-gpios = <&gpio0 30 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 		firmware-gpios = <&gpio0 31 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/pn544.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/pn544.txt
index 92f399ec22b8..2bd82562ce8e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/pn544.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/pn544.txt
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Example (for ARM-based BeagleBone with PN544 on I2C2):
 		clock-frequency = <400000>;
 
 		interrupt-parent = <&gpio1>;
-		interrupts = <17 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+		interrupts = <17 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 		enable-gpios = <&gpio3 21 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 		firmware-gpios = <&gpio3 19 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rng/omap3_rom_rng.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rng/omap3_rom_rng.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f315c9723bd2
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rng/omap3_rom_rng.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+OMAP ROM RNG driver binding
+
+Secure SoCs may provide RNG via secure ROM calls like Nokia N900 does. The
+implementation can depend on the SoC secure ROM used.
+
+- compatible:
+	Usage: required
+	Value type: <string>
+	Definition: must be "nokia,n900-rom-rng"
+
+- clocks:
+	Usage: required
+	Value type: <prop-encoded-array>
+	Definition: reference to the the RNG interface clock
+
+- clock-names:
+	Usage: required
+	Value type: <stringlist>
+	Definition: must be "ick"
+
+Example:
+
+	rom_rng: rng {
+		compatible = "nokia,n900-rom-rng";
+		clocks = <&rng_ick>;
+		clock-names = "ick";
+	};
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rtc/abracon,abx80x.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rtc/abracon,abx80x.txt
index be789685a1c2..18b892d010d8 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rtc/abracon,abx80x.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rtc/abracon,abx80x.txt
@@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ and valid to enable charging:
 
  - "abracon,tc-diode": should be "standard" (0.6V) or "schottky" (0.3V)
  - "abracon,tc-resistor": should be <0>, <3>, <6> or <11>. 0 disables the output
-                          resistor, the other values are in ohm.
+                          resistor, the other values are in kOhm.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/wm8994.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/wm8994.txt
index 68cccc4653ba..367b58ce1bb9 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/wm8994.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/wm8994.txt
@@ -14,9 +14,15 @@ Required properties:
   - #gpio-cells : Must be 2. The first cell is the pin number and the
     second cell is used to specify optional parameters (currently unused).
 
-  - AVDD2-supply, DBVDD1-supply, DBVDD2-supply, DBVDD3-supply, CPVDD-supply,
-    SPKVDD1-supply, SPKVDD2-supply : power supplies for the device, as covered
-    in Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/regulator.txt
+  - power supplies for the device, as covered in
+    Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/regulator.txt, depending
+    on compatible:
+    - for wlf,wm1811 and wlf,wm8958:
+      AVDD1-supply, AVDD2-supply, DBVDD1-supply, DBVDD2-supply, DBVDD3-supply,
+      DCVDD-supply, CPVDD-supply, SPKVDD1-supply, SPKVDD2-supply
+    - for wlf,wm8994:
+      AVDD1-supply, AVDD2-supply, DBVDD-supply, DCVDD-supply, CPVDD-supply,
+      SPKVDD1-supply, SPKVDD2-supply
 
 Optional properties:
 
@@ -73,11 +79,11 @@ wm8994: codec@1a {
 
 	lineout1-se;
 
+	AVDD1-supply = <&regulator>;
 	AVDD2-supply = <&regulator>;
 	CPVDD-supply = <&regulator>;
-	DBVDD1-supply = <&regulator>;
-	DBVDD2-supply = <&regulator>;
-	DBVDD3-supply = <&regulator>;
+	DBVDD-supply = <&regulator>;
+	DCVDD-supply = <&regulator>;
 	SPKVDD1-supply = <&regulator>;
 	SPKVDD2-supply = <&regulator>;
 };
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/spi/spi-uniphier.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/spi/spi-uniphier.txt
index 504a4ecfc7b1..b04e66a52de5 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/spi/spi-uniphier.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/spi/spi-uniphier.txt
@@ -5,18 +5,20 @@ UniPhier SoCs have SCSSI which supports SPI single channel.
 Required properties:
  - compatible: should be "socionext,uniphier-scssi"
  - reg: address and length of the spi master registers
- - #address-cells: must be <1>, see spi-bus.txt
- - #size-cells: must be <0>, see spi-bus.txt
- - clocks: A phandle to the clock for the device.
- - resets: A phandle to the reset control for the device.
+ - interrupts: a single interrupt specifier
+ - pinctrl-names: should be "default"
+ - pinctrl-0: pin control state for the default mode
+ - clocks: a phandle to the clock for the device
+ - resets: a phandle to the reset control for the device
 
 Example:
 
 spi0: spi@54006000 {
 	compatible = "socionext,uniphier-scssi";
 	reg = <0x54006000 0x100>;
-	#address-cells = <1>;
-	#size-cells = <0>;
+	interrupts = <0 39 4>;
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&pinctrl_spi0>;
 	clocks = <&peri_clk 11>;
 	resets = <&peri_rst 11>;
 };
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/dwc3.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/dwc3.txt
index 3e4c38b806ac..ae46c0ac9f11 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/dwc3.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/dwc3.txt
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ Optional properties:
 			from P0 to P1/P2/P3 without delay.
  - snps,dis-tx-ipgap-linecheck-quirk: when set, disable u2mac linestate check
 			during HS transmit.
+ - snps,parkmode-disable-ss-quirk: when set, all SuperSpeed bus instances in
+			park mode are disabled.
  - snps,dis_metastability_quirk: when set, disable metastability workaround.
 			CAUTION: use only if you are absolutely sure of it.
  - snps,is-utmi-l1-suspend: true when DWC3 asserts output signal
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/driver-api/device_link.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/driver-api/device_link.rst
index d6763272e747..e8b0a8fd1ae0 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/driver-api/device_link.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/driver-api/device_link.rst
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ suspend/resume and shutdown ordering.
 
 Device links allow representation of such dependencies in the driver core.
 
-In its standard form, a device link combines *both* dependency types:
-It guarantees correct suspend/resume and shutdown ordering between a
+In its standard or *managed* form, a device link combines *both* dependency
+types:  It guarantees correct suspend/resume and shutdown ordering between a
 "supplier" device and its "consumer" devices, and it guarantees driver
 presence on the supplier.  The consumer devices are not probed before the
 supplier is bound to a driver, and they're unbound before the supplier
@@ -59,18 +59,24 @@ device ``->probe`` callback or a boot-time PCI quirk.
 
 Another example for an inconsistent state would be a device link that
 represents a driver presence dependency, yet is added from the consumer's
-``->probe`` callback while the supplier hasn't probed yet:  Had the driver
-core known about the device link earlier, it wouldn't have probed the
+``->probe`` callback while the supplier hasn't started to probe yet:  Had the
+driver core known about the device link earlier, it wouldn't have probed the
 consumer in the first place.  The onus is thus on the consumer to check
 presence of the supplier after adding the link, and defer probing on
-non-presence.
-
-If a device link is added in the ``->probe`` callback of the supplier or
-consumer driver, it is typically deleted in its ``->remove`` callback for
-symmetry.  That way, if the driver is compiled as a module, the device
-link is added on module load and orderly deleted on unload.  The same
-restrictions that apply to device link addition (e.g. exclusion of a
-parallel suspend/resume transition) apply equally to deletion.
+non-presence.  [Note that it is valid to create a link from the consumer's
+``->probe`` callback while the supplier is still probing, but the consumer must
+know that the supplier is functional already at the link creation time (that is
+the case, for instance, if the consumer has just acquired some resources that
+would not have been available had the supplier not been functional then).]
+
+If a device link with ``DL_FLAG_STATELESS`` set (i.e. a stateless device link)
+is added in the ``->probe`` callback of the supplier or consumer driver, it is
+typically deleted in its ``->remove`` callback for symmetry.  That way, if the
+driver is compiled as a module, the device link is added on module load and
+orderly deleted on unload.  The same restrictions that apply to device link
+addition (e.g. exclusion of a parallel suspend/resume transition) apply equally
+to deletion.  Device links managed by the driver core are deleted automatically
+by it.
 
 Several flags may be specified on device link addition, two of which
 have already been mentioned above:  ``DL_FLAG_STATELESS`` to express that no
@@ -83,22 +89,37 @@ link is added from the consumer's ``->probe`` callback:  ``DL_FLAG_RPM_ACTIVE``
 can be specified to runtime resume the supplier upon addition of the
 device link.  ``DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_CONSUMER`` causes the device link to be
 automatically purged when the consumer fails to probe or later unbinds.
-This obviates the need to explicitly delete the link in the ``->remove``
-callback or in the error path of the ``->probe`` callback.
 
 Similarly, when the device link is added from supplier's ``->probe`` callback,
 ``DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_SUPPLIER`` causes the device link to be automatically
 purged when the supplier fails to probe or later unbinds.
 
+If neither ``DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_CONSUMER`` nor ``DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_SUPPLIER``
+is set, ``DL_FLAG_AUTOPROBE_CONSUMER`` can be used to request the driver core
+to probe for a driver for the consumer driver on the link automatically after
+a driver has been bound to the supplier device.
+
+Note, however, that any combinations of ``DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_CONSUMER``,
+``DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_SUPPLIER`` or ``DL_FLAG_AUTOPROBE_CONSUMER`` with
+``DL_FLAG_STATELESS`` are invalid and cannot be used.
+
 Limitations
 ===========
 
-Driver authors should be aware that a driver presence dependency (i.e. when
-``DL_FLAG_STATELESS`` is not specified on link addition) may cause probing of
-the consumer to be deferred indefinitely.  This can become a problem if the
-consumer is required to probe before a certain initcall level is reached.
-Worse, if the supplier driver is blacklisted or missing, the consumer will
-never be probed.
+Driver authors should be aware that a driver presence dependency for managed
+device links (i.e. when ``DL_FLAG_STATELESS`` is not specified on link addition)
+may cause probing of the consumer to be deferred indefinitely.  This can become
+a problem if the consumer is required to probe before a certain initcall level
+is reached.  Worse, if the supplier driver is blacklisted or missing, the
+consumer will never be probed.
+
+Moreover, managed device links cannot be deleted directly.  They are deleted
+by the driver core when they are not necessary any more in accordance with the
+``DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_CONSUMER`` and ``DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_SUPPLIER`` flags.
+However, stateless device links (i.e. device links with ``DL_FLAG_STATELESS``
+set) are expected to be removed by whoever called :c:func:`device_link_add()`
+to add them with the help of either :c:func:`device_link_del()` or
+:c:func:`device_link_remove()`.
 
 Sometimes drivers depend on optional resources.  They are able to operate
 in a degraded mode (reduced feature set or performance) when those resources
@@ -282,4 +303,4 @@ API
 ===
 
 .. kernel-doc:: drivers/base/core.c
-   :functions: device_link_add device_link_del
+   :functions: device_link_add device_link_del device_link_remove
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/driver-api/libata.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/driver-api/libata.rst
index 70e180e6b93d..9f3e5dc31184 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/driver-api/libata.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/driver-api/libata.rst
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ High-level taskfile hooks
 
 ::
 
-    void (*qc_prep) (struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+    enum ata_completion_errors (*qc_prep) (struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
     int (*qc_issue) (struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/driver-api/mtdnand.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/driver-api/mtdnand.rst
index c55a6034c397..5470a3d6bd9e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/driver-api/mtdnand.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/driver-api/mtdnand.rst
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ necessary information about the device.
         this->eccmode = NAND_ECC_SOFT;
 
         /* Scan to find existence of the device */
-        if (nand_scan (board_mtd, 1)) {
+        if (nand_scan (this, 1)) {
             err = -ENXIO;
             goto out_ior;
         }
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ unregisters the partitions in the MTD layer.
     static void __exit board_cleanup (void)
     {
         /* Release resources, unregister device */
-        nand_release (board_mtd);
+        nand_release (mtd_to_nand(board_mtd));
 
         /* unmap physical address */
         iounmap(baseaddr);
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/driver-api/usb/power-management.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/driver-api/usb/power-management.rst
index 79beb807996b..4a74cf6f2797 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/driver-api/usb/power-management.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/driver-api/usb/power-management.rst
@@ -370,11 +370,15 @@ autosuspend the interface's device.  When the usage counter is = 0
 then the interface is considered to be idle, and the kernel may
 autosuspend the device.
 
-Drivers need not be concerned about balancing changes to the usage
-counter; the USB core will undo any remaining "get"s when a driver
-is unbound from its interface.  As a corollary, drivers must not call
-any of the ``usb_autopm_*`` functions after their ``disconnect``
-routine has returned.
+Drivers must be careful to balance their overall changes to the usage
+counter.  Unbalanced "get"s will remain in effect when a driver is
+unbound from its interface, preventing the device from going into
+runtime suspend should the interface be bound to a driver again.  On
+the other hand, drivers are allowed to achieve this balance by calling
+the ``usb_autopm_*`` functions even after their ``disconnect`` routine
+has returned -- say from within a work-queue routine -- provided they
+retain an active reference to the interface (via ``usb_get_intf`` and
+``usb_put_intf``).
 
 Drivers using the async routines are responsible for their own
 synchronization and mutual exclusion.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/affs.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/affs.txt
index 71b63c2b9841..a8f1a58e3692 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/affs.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/affs.txt
@@ -93,13 +93,15 @@ The Amiga protection flags RWEDRWEDHSPARWED are handled as follows:
 
   - R maps to r for user, group and others. On directories, R implies x.
 
-  - If both W and D are allowed, w will be set.
+  - W maps to w.
 
   - E maps to x.
 
-  - H and P are always retained and ignored under Linux.
+  - D is ignored.
 
-  - A is always reset when a file is written to.
+  - H, S and P are always retained and ignored under Linux.
+
+  - A is cleared when a file is written to.
 
 User id and group id will be used unless set[gu]id are given as mount
 options. Since most of the Amiga file systems are single user systems
@@ -111,11 +113,13 @@ Linux -> Amiga:
 
 The Linux rwxrwxrwx file mode is handled as follows:
 
-  - r permission will set R for user, group and others.
+  - r permission will allow R for user, group and others.
+
+  - w permission will allow W for user, group and others.
 
-  - w permission will set W and D for user, group and others.
+  - x permission of the user will allow E for plain files.
 
-  - x permission of the user will set E for plain files.
+  - D will be allowed for user, group and others.
 
   - All other flags (suid, sgid, ...) are ignored and will
     not be retained.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
index 48b424de85bb..5b667ee1242a 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
@@ -191,21 +191,11 @@ Currently, the following pairs of encryption modes are supported:
 
 - AES-256-XTS for contents and AES-256-CTS-CBC for filenames
 - AES-128-CBC for contents and AES-128-CTS-CBC for filenames
-- Speck128/256-XTS for contents and Speck128/256-CTS-CBC for filenames
 
 It is strongly recommended to use AES-256-XTS for contents encryption.
 AES-128-CBC was added only for low-powered embedded devices with
 crypto accelerators such as CAAM or CESA that do not support XTS.
 
-Similarly, Speck128/256 support was only added for older or low-end
-CPUs which cannot do AES fast enough -- especially ARM CPUs which have
-NEON instructions but not the Cryptography Extensions -- and for which
-it would not otherwise be feasible to use encryption at all.  It is
-not recommended to use Speck on CPUs that have AES instructions.
-Speck support is only available if it has been enabled in the crypto
-API via CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK.  Also, on ARM platforms, to get
-acceptable performance CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK_NEON must be enabled.
-
 New encryption modes can be added relatively easily, without changes
 to individual filesystems.  However, authenticated encryption (AE)
 modes are not currently supported because of the difficulty of dealing
@@ -436,10 +426,18 @@ astute users may notice some differences in behavior:
 - Unencrypted files, or files encrypted with a different encryption
   policy (i.e. different key, modes, or flags), cannot be renamed or
   linked into an encrypted directory; see `Encryption policy
-  enforcement`_.  Attempts to do so will fail with EPERM.  However,
+  enforcement`_.  Attempts to do so will fail with EXDEV.  However,
   encrypted files can be renamed within an encrypted directory, or
   into an unencrypted directory.
 
+  Note: "moving" an unencrypted file into an encrypted directory, e.g.
+  with the `mv` program, is implemented in userspace by a copy
+  followed by a delete.  Be aware that the original unencrypted data
+  may remain recoverable from free space on the disk; prefer to keep
+  all files encrypted from the very beginning.  The `shred` program
+  may be used to overwrite the source files but isn't guaranteed to be
+  effective on all filesystems and storage devices.
+
 - Direct I/O is not supported on encrypted files.  Attempts to use
   direct I/O on such files will fall back to buffered I/O.
 
@@ -526,7 +524,7 @@ not be encrypted.
 Except for those special files, it is forbidden to have unencrypted
 files, or files encrypted with a different encryption policy, in an
 encrypted directory tree.  Attempts to link or rename such a file into
-an encrypted directory will fail with EPERM.  This is also enforced
+an encrypted directory will fail with EXDEV.  This is also enforced
 during ->lookup() to provide limited protection against offline
 attacks that try to disable or downgrade encryption in known locations
 where applications may later write sensitive data.  It is recommended
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/mandatory-locking.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/mandatory-locking.txt
index 0979d1d2ca8b..a251ca33164a 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/mandatory-locking.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/mandatory-locking.txt
@@ -169,3 +169,13 @@ havoc if they lock crucial files. The way around it is to change the file
 permissions (remove the setgid bit) before trying to read or write to it.
 Of course, that might be a bit tricky if the system is hung :-(
 
+7. The "mand" mount option
+--------------------------
+Mandatory locking is disabled on all filesystems by default, and must be
+administratively enabled by mounting with "-o mand". That mount option
+is only allowed if the mounting task has the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability.
+
+Since kernel v4.5, it is possible to disable mandatory locking
+altogether by setting CONFIG_MANDATORY_FILE_LOCKING to "n". A kernel
+with this disabled will reject attempts to mount filesystems with the
+"mand" mount option with the error status EPERM.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
index 51c136c821bf..d7dc9c818b83 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
@@ -286,6 +286,12 @@ pointed by REDIRECT. This should not be possible on local system as setting
 "trusted." xattrs will require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. But it should be possible
 for untrusted layers like from a pen drive.
 
+Note: redirect_dir={off|nofollow|follow(*)} conflicts with metacopy=on, and
+results in an error.
+
+(*) redirect_dir=follow only conflicts with metacopy=on if upperdir=... is
+given.
+
 Sharing and copying layers
 --------------------------
 
@@ -296,7 +302,7 @@ beneath or above the path of another overlay lower layer path.
 
 Using an upper layer path and/or a workdir path that are already used by
 another overlay mount is not allowed and may fail with EBUSY.  Using
-partially overlapping paths is not allowed but will not fail with EBUSY.
+partially overlapping paths is not allowed and may fail with EBUSY.
 If files are accessed from two overlayfs mounts which share or overlap the
 upper layer and/or workdir path the behavior of the overlay is undefined,
 though it will not result in a crash or deadlock.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/porting linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/porting
index 7b7b845c490a..041b0ded8b44 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/porting
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/porting
@@ -622,3 +622,15 @@ in your dentry operations instead.
 	alloc_file_clone(file, flags, ops) does not affect any caller's references.
 	On success you get a new struct file sharing the mount/dentry with the
 	original, on failure - ERR_PTR().
+--
+[mandatory]
+	DCACHE_RCUACCESS is gone; having an RCU delay on dentry freeing is the
+	default.  DCACHE_NORCU opts out, and only d_alloc_pseudo() has any
+	business doing so.
+--
+[mandatory]
+
+	[should've been added in 2016] stale comment in finish_open()
+	nonwithstanding, failure exits in ->atomic_open() instances should
+	*NOT* fput() the file, no matter what.  Everything is handled by the
+	caller.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
index 22b4b00dee31..0d0ecc7df260 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
@@ -425,6 +425,7 @@ SwapPss:               0 kB
 KernelPageSize:        4 kB
 MMUPageSize:           4 kB
 Locked:                0 kB
+THPeligible:           0
 VmFlags: rd ex mr mw me dw
 
 the first of these lines shows the same information as is displayed for the
@@ -462,6 +463,8 @@ replaced by copy-on-write) part of the underlying shmem object out on swap.
 "SwapPss" shows proportional swap share of this mapping. Unlike "Swap", this
 does not take into account swapped out page of underlying shmem objects.
 "Locked" indicates whether the mapping is locked in memory or not.
+"THPeligible" indicates whether the mapping is eligible for THP pages - 1 if
+true, 0 otherwise.
 
 "VmFlags" field deserves a separate description. This member represents the kernel
 flags associated with the particular virtual memory area in two letter encoded
@@ -496,7 +499,9 @@ manner. The codes are the following:
 
 Note that there is no guarantee that every flag and associated mnemonic will
 be present in all further kernel releases. Things get changed, the flags may
-be vanished or the reverse -- new added.
+be vanished or the reverse -- new added. Interpretation of their meaning
+might change in future as well. So each consumer of these flags has to
+follow each specific kernel version for the exact semantic.
 
 This file is only present if the CONFIG_MMU kernel configuration option is
 enabled.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/seq_file.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/seq_file.txt
index d412b236a9d6..7cf7143921a1 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/seq_file.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/seq_file.txt
@@ -192,6 +192,12 @@ between the calls to start() and stop(), so holding a lock during that time
 is a reasonable thing to do. The seq_file code will also avoid taking any
 other locks while the iterator is active.
 
+The iterater value returned by start() or next() is guaranteed to be
+passed to a subsequent next() or stop() call.  This allows resources
+such as locks that were taken to be reliably released.  There is *no*
+guarantee that the iterator will be passed to show(), though in practice
+it often will be.
+
 
 Formatted output
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/sysfs.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/sysfs.txt
index a1426cabcef1..2e38fafc1b63 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/sysfs.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/filesystems/sysfs.txt
@@ -211,12 +211,10 @@ Other notes:
   is 4096. 
 
 - show() methods should return the number of bytes printed into the
-  buffer. This is the return value of scnprintf().
+  buffer.
 
-- show() must not use snprintf() when formatting the value to be
-  returned to user space. If you can guarantee that an overflow
-  will never happen you can use sprintf() otherwise you must use
-  scnprintf().
+- show() should only use sysfs_emit() or sysfs_emit_at() when formatting
+  the value to be returned to user space.
 
 - store() should return the number of bytes used from the buffer. If the
   entire buffer has been used, just return the count argument.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/hid/uhid.txt linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/hid/uhid.txt
index c8656dd029a9..958fff945304 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/hid/uhid.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/hid/uhid.txt
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ them but you should handle them according to your needs.
   UHID_OUTPUT:
   This is sent if the HID device driver wants to send raw data to the I/O
   device on the interrupt channel. You should read the payload and forward it to
-  the device. The payload is of type "struct uhid_data_req".
+  the device. The payload is of type "struct uhid_output_req".
   This may be received even though you haven't received UHID_OPEN, yet.
 
   UHID_GET_REPORT:
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/i2c/busses/i2c-i801 linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/i2c/busses/i2c-i801
index d1ee484a787d..ee9984f35868 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/i2c/busses/i2c-i801
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/i2c/busses/i2c-i801
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ Supported adapters:
   * Intel Cannon Lake (PCH)
   * Intel Cedar Fork (PCH)
   * Intel Ice Lake (PCH)
+  * Intel Comet Lake (PCH)
    Datasheets: Publicly available at the Intel website
 
 On Intel Patsburg and later chipsets, both the normal host SMBus controller
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/index.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/index.rst
index 5db7e87c7cb1..1cdc139adb40 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/index.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/index.rst
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ implementation.
    :maxdepth: 2
 
    sh/index
+   x86/index
 
 Filesystem Documentation
 ------------------------
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/kbuild/llvm.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/kbuild/llvm.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c776b6eee969
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/kbuild/llvm.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+==============================
+Building Linux with Clang/LLVM
+==============================
+
+This document covers how to build the Linux kernel with Clang and LLVM
+utilities.
+
+About
+-----
+
+The Linux kernel has always traditionally been compiled with GNU toolchains
+such as GCC and binutils. Ongoing work has allowed for `Clang
+<https://clang.llvm.org/>`_ and `LLVM <https://llvm.org/>`_ utilities to be
+used as viable substitutes. Distributions such as `Android
+<https://www.android.com/>`_, `ChromeOS
+<https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os>`_, and `OpenMandriva
+<https://www.openmandriva.org/>`_ use Clang built kernels.  `LLVM is a
+collection of toolchain components implemented in terms of C++ objects
+<https://www.aosabook.org/en/llvm.html>`_. Clang is a front-end to LLVM that
+supports C and the GNU C extensions required by the kernel, and is pronounced
+"klang," not "see-lang."
+
+Clang
+-----
+
+The compiler used can be swapped out via `CC=` command line argument to `make`.
+`CC=` should be set when selecting a config and during a build.
+
+	make CC=clang defconfig
+
+	make CC=clang
+
+Cross Compiling
+---------------
+
+A single Clang compiler binary will typically contain all supported backends,
+which can help simplify cross compiling.
+
+	ARCH=arm64 CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- make CC=clang
+
+`CROSS_COMPILE` is not used to prefix the Clang compiler binary, instead
+`CROSS_COMPILE` is used to set a command line flag: `--target <triple>`. For
+example:
+
+	clang --target aarch64-linux-gnu foo.c
+
+LLVM Utilities
+--------------
+
+LLVM has substitutes for GNU binutils utilities. Kbuild supports `LLVM=1`
+to enable them.
+
+	make LLVM=1
+
+They can be enabled individually. The full list of the parameters:
+
+	make CC=clang LD=ld.lld AR=llvm-ar NM=llvm-nm STRIP=llvm-strip \\
+	  OBJCOPY=llvm-objcopy OBJDUMP=llvm-objdump OBJSIZE=llvm-size \\
+	  READELF=llvm-readelf HOSTCC=clang HOSTCXX=clang++ HOSTAR=llvm-ar \\
+	  HOSTLD=ld.lld
+
+Currently, the integrated assembler is disabled by default. You can pass
+`LLVM_IAS=1` to enable it.
+
+Getting Help
+------------
+
+- `Website <https://clangbuiltlinux.github.io/>`_
+- `Mailing List <https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/clang-built-linux>`_: <clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com>
+- `Issue Tracker <https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues>`_
+- IRC: #clangbuiltlinux on chat.freenode.net
+- `Telegram <https://t.me/ClangBuiltLinux>`_: @ClangBuiltLinux
+- `Wiki <https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/wiki>`_
+- `Beginner Bugs <https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Aissue+label%3A%22good+first+issue%22>`_
+
+Getting LLVM
+-------------
+
+- http://releases.llvm.org/download.html
+- https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project
+- https://llvm.org/docs/GettingStarted.html
+- https://llvm.org/docs/CMake.html
+- https://apt.llvm.org/
+- https://www.archlinux.org/packages/extra/x86_64/llvm/
+- https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/tc-build
+- https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/wiki/Building-Clang-from-source
+- https://android.googlesource.com/platform/prebuilts/clang/host/linux-x86/
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/media/uapi/cec/cec-ioc-receive.rst linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/media/uapi/cec/cec-ioc-receive.rst
index e964074cd15b..b25e48afaa08 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu/Documentation/media/uapi/cec/cec-ioc-receive.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.205-gnu/Documentation/media/uapi/cec/cec-ioc-receive.rst
@@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ CEC_RECEIVE, CEC_TRANSMIT - Receive or transmit a CEC message
 Synopsis
 ========
 
-.. c:function:: int ioctl( int fd, CEC_RECEIVE, struct cec_msg *argp )
+.. c:function:: int ioctl( int fd, CEC_RECEIVE, struct cec_msg \*argp )
     :name: CEC_RECEIVE
 
-.. c:function:: int ioctl( int fd, CEC_TRANSMIT, struct cec_msg *argp )
+.. c:function:: int ioctl( int fd, CEC_TRANSMIT, struct cec_msg \*argp )
     :name: CEC_TRANSMIT
 
 Arguments
@@ -272,6 +272,19 @@ View On' messages from initiator 0xf ('Unregistered') to destination 0 ('TV').
       - The transmit failed after one or more retries. This status bit is
 	mutually exclusive with :ref:`CEC_TX_STATUS_OK <CEC-TX-STATUS-OK>`.
 	Other bits can still be set to explain which failures were seen.
+    * .. _`CEC-TX-STATUS-ABORTED`:
+
+      - ``CEC_TX_STATUS_ABORTED``
+      - 0x40
+      - The transmit was aborted due to an HDMI disconnect, or the adapter
+        was unconfigured, or a transmit was interrupted, or the driver
+	returned an error when attempting to start a transmit.
+    * .. _`CEC-TX-STATUS-TIMEOUT`:
+
+      - ``CEC_TX_STATUS_TIMEOUT``
+      - 0x80
+      - The transmit timed out. This should not normally happen and this
+	indicates a driver problem.
 
 
 .. tabularcolumns:: |p{5.6cm}|p{0.9cm}|p{11.0cm}|
@@ -300,6 +313,14 @@ View On' messages from initiator 0xf ('Unregistered') to destination 0 ('TV').
       - The message was received successfully but the reply was
 	``CEC_MSG_FEATURE_ABORT``. This status is only set if this message
 	was the reply to an earlier transmitted message.
+    * .. _`CEC-RX-STATUS-ABORTED`:
+
+      - ``CEC_RX_STATUS_ABORTED``
+      - 0x08
+      - The wait for a reply to an earlier transmitted message was aborted
+        because the HDMI cable was disconnected, the adapter was unconfigured
+	